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The Decline of the Lawyer-Politician
NICK ROBINSON†
INTRODUCTION
In Democracy in America, Alexis De Tocqueville
famously noted, “[s]carcely any political question arises in
the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a
judicial question.”1 This observation about the close
interplay of the judicial and political branches in the United
States is almost certainly an over-generalization,2 but it also
captures a central feature of the U.S. system of government
† Robina Fellow at Yale Law School, Lecturer in Political Science at Yale
University, and affiliated Fellow at Harvard Law School’s Center on the Legal
Profession. I would like to thank David Wilkins, Vic Khanna, Marc Galanter,
Rick Abel, Bob Kagan, Guido Calabresi, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Lawrence Lessig,
Richard Abel, David Mayhew, Heather Gerken, John Witt, Shauna Shames,
Alicia Bannon, Adam Lioz, Ben Schneer, William Hubbard, Robert Gordon,
Gordon Silverstein, Maya Sen, Nick Carnes, Douglas McDonald, Bryon Fong,
Derek Davis, and participants of a workshop at Harvard Law School’s Center on
the Legal Profession for their feedback on this Article.
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
1945).
2. JEB BARNES & THOMAS F. BURKE, HOW POLICY SHAPES POLITICS: RIGHTS,
COURTS, LITIGATION, AND THE STRUGGLE OVER INJURY COMPENSATION 1 (2015)
(citing to literature arguing that de Tocqueville may have been wrong that all
political disputes do not eventually become judicial ones in the U.S., but that the
observation does explain a significant portion of U.S. politics); Mark A. Graber,
Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville’s Thesis
Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 487 (2004) (arguing that most national
political questions that existed when de Tocqueville was writing during the
Jacksonian era were not, in fact, resolved into judicial questions).
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and is frequently repeated by scholars.3 What is less often
emphasized is that not only do political issues in the United
States often go from being debated in legislatures to argued
in the courts, but that those who do the debating and arguing
have frequently moved in their careers between these bodies
as well.4 Or, at the very least, they come from the same
professional background: they are lawyers.
Historically, lawyers have not only monopolized
positions in the court system, but have also dominated the
political leadership of the United States. Since
independence, more than half of all presidents,
vicepresidents, and members of Congress have come from a
law background.5 At the state level, a similar, if less
pronounced, pattern has been repeated.6 Yet, while lawyers’
ubiquity in politics is relatively common knowledge, there
3. See, e.g., BARNHOES & BURKE, supra note 2, at 1.
4. De Tocqueville himself is an exception to this dearth of attention. In
Democracy in America, he emphasized the lawyers’ prevalence in the U.S.
political system and described its effect on U.S. democracy. DE TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 1, at 280.
5. While the occupational backgrounds of all presidents and vicepresidents
were coded for this Article, the conclusion that over half of all members of
Congress have come from a law background was calculated through a
combination of counting and sampling. According to compiled data from CQ Press
from 1945 to 2016, 46% of those that have served in Congress have been lawyers,
or 1,963 of the 4,275 members of Congress during this period. CQ Press, Congress
Collection, http://library.cqpress.com/congress/ (last visited June 8, 2017)
[hereinafter CQ Press]. From the early 19th century to 1945, over 60%, and
frequently over 70%, of the members of Congress sampled for this study were
lawyers. See infra Section II.A. This combination of sampling and counting from
different periods indicates that well over half of all members of Congress have
been lawyers.
6. HEINZ EULAU & JOHN D. SPRAGUE, LAWYERS IN POLITICS: A STUDY OF
PROFESSIONAL CONVERGENCE 11–12 (1964) (recounting studies showing that in
the late 19th and early to mid-20th century, lawyers were prevalent as governors
and state legislators, but not as prevalent as lawyers as U.S. presidents or
members of Congress); Richard L. Engstrom & Patrick F. O’Connor, LawyerLegislators and Support for State Legislative Reform, 42 J. POL. 207, 267 (1980)
(noting that in 1980, lawyer-legislators comprised from a quarter to over half of
state legislatures whereas the U.S. Congress is generally comprised of over half
lawyer members).
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has been almost no study of how lawyers’ prevalence in
politics has changed over time, why these changes might
have occurred, or whether a shift in the prevalence of
lawyers—or the types of lawyers—in politics even matters.7
This Article helps address these gaps. It examines a
unique data set of the occupational background of members
of the U.S. Congress that spans more than two hundred
years from the 1st Congress to the 114th Congress. This data
shows that the proportion of lawyers in Congress has not
been static. Instead, after a notable increase in the number
of lawyers in the U.S. Congress after Independence, there
has been a slow, but steady, decline in their numbers. In the
mid-nineteenth century, almost 80% of members of Congress
were lawyers.8 By the 1960s, this dropped to under 60%, and
in the 114th Congress, the number of lawyer-members in
Congress was slightly under 40%.9
I argue this decline has been caused in large part by new
types of specialization both in politics and in law. In politics,
lawyers now face new competition from what this Article
refers to as a “specialized political class” comprised of
political aides and members of civil society.10 Those from this
political class have many, if not more, of the advantages that
lawyers historically have had in politics from flexible careers

7. While scholars have largely ignored the effect of the changing prevalence
of lawyers in politics, they have attempted to assess the effect of their ubiquity.
For example, there have been several studies that have attempted to determine
whether the presence of lawyers has had an effect on legislative outcomes. See
sources cited infra note 195.
8. See infra Section II.A, Table 2.
9. See infra Section II.A, Table 2.
10. The term “specialized political class” is not common, but others have used
variants, particularly in other countries. See, e.g., TREVOR COOK, WHITLAM’S
GRANDCHILDREN: WHAT THE CLASS OF 2007 TELLS US ABOUT THE ALP 10 (Aug.
2009), http://trevorcook.typepad.com/files/rudds-class-of-2007.pdf (describing the
rise of a “professional political class” in Australia when noting the decline of
lawyers in elected office there and the rise of those who have made politics a
vocation).
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that frequently incentivize running for office to readymade
networks of campaign contributors.11 Meanwhile, in law,
lawyers find themselves in an increasingly professionalized
and commercialized work environment that prizes
specializations like corporate law that seem to have less
overlap or synergy with a career in politics.12
But what consequences does the decline of lawyers in
Congress, and politics more generally, actually have?
Certainly, it is significant for the legal profession itself, likely
decreasing the number of politically ambitious young people
who enter law and potentially creating a more inward
looking and less public-spirited profession.13 It may also
affect the diversity of Congress—for example, the relatively
low proportion of women in the U.S. Congress compared to
other advanced democracies may be partly caused by law
traditionally being a gatekeeping occupation for a political
career.14 In fact, evidence is presented in this Article that
women members of Congress have traditionally been less
likely to be lawyers, perhaps because women, in general,
have faced so many barriers in the legal profession.15
11. See infra Section IV.A.
12. See infra Section IV.B.
13. In recent years, there has been a widespread view among many scholars
that law has become more of a business and less of a public-spirited profession.
This perception has several potential causes, including increased specialization
that reduces the cohesion of the bar and increases the focus of law firms on
profits. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 283, 297 (1998).
14. While the hurdles women have faced in the legal profession may
contribute to their relatively low representation in U.S. politics as shown in
Section II.B, this is likely not the primary reason for their low representation.
For example, there is some evidence that it may be caused by the structure of the
U.S. electoral system. Steven Hill, Why Does the US Still Have So Few Women in
Office?, THE NATION (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-doesus-still-have-so-few-women-office/ (noting that, according to one ranking, the
United States ranked 98th among world powers in the proportion of women in
higher office as well as arguing that countries with proportional representation
election systems elect more women).
15. See infra Section II.B.
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However, this Article focuses on the significance of the
lawyer-politician for the U.S. legal system. I argue that there
are two primary ways the prevalence of lawyer-politicians
has historically affected the justice system. First, I claim that
lawyer-members of Congress have helped foster the
centrality of lawyers and courts in the United States. For
example, while lawyer-members of Congress do not generally
vote differently than their peers on most legislation,16 this
Article presents new evidence that they are more likely to
oppose tort reform that caps damages and to support funding
for civil legal aid.17 Lawyer-members of Congress are also
more likely to sit on committees affecting the legal system
and express a strong commitment to protecting judicial
independence.18 More generally, lawyer-members may have
historical helped foster what Robert Kagan has called the
United States’ emphasis on “adversarial legalism,” in which
lawyers, courts, and litigation disproportionately dominate
policy implementation.19
Second, the decline of the lawyer-politician in Congress
has corresponded to an even more precipitous drop in lawyerpoliticians in the courts—in other words, judges becoming
politicians or politicians later becoming judges.20 In turn, a
specialized class of judges, who have a narrower range of
career experiences (particularly previous experience as a

16. After World War II, scholars hypothesized that lawyer-politicians would
vote differently than their peers, but very limited evidence was found to support
this theory. See sources cited infra note 195.
17. See infra Section V.A.
18. See infra Section V.A.
19. ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3, 11
(2001) (juxtaposing the prevalence of “adversarial legalism” in the U.S. to the
more Weberian hierarchical legalism common in Europe).
20. There has also been a smaller, but noteworthy, drop of former prosecutors
in Congress. For data on the decline of politician judges and politician
prosecutors, see infra Table 9 and accompanying text.
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judge), is replacing this earlier group of politician judges.21
This shift towards a more technocratic judiciary means
judges are less likely to have personal political ambition
influence their duties, but they also have less political
experience to draw on in their work.22 The rise of a
professionalized judiciary may ironically reduce judicial
independence, as the president and U.S. Senate can use the
judicial record of nominees for the Supreme Court or Court
of Appeals to test if they have judicial philosophies that
correspond with their own and, in turn, lower court judges
may change their behavior to audition for a “promotion” to
these higher courts.23
Not only does the decline of lawyer-politicians in the
United States affect the legal system, but it may also, albeit
more speculatively, shape adherence to the rule of law by the
country’s political leadership.24 United States democracy
emerged from a unique set of historical and political
circumstances.25 Significantly, it was not just the country’s
laws and institutions, or the preferences of its citizens, that
fostered the country’s strong commitment to the rule of law—
it was also the norms that its leaders have followed.26 The
decline of the lawyer politician in all branches of government
may undermine these governing norms: whether it is fewer
politicians that are immersed in the language of rights and
due process or fewer judges that are savvy to the world of
politics. Of course, the arrival of those from backgrounds

21. See infra Section V.B.2.
22. For a discussion of this point, see infra Section V.B.2.
23. See infra Section V.B.2.
24. This Article uses the term “rule of law” broadly to encompass not only the
predictable application of the law, but also due process, basic civil rights, and the
independence of the courts. For an overview of the different ways the term “rule
of law” has been used, see Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43
GA. L. REV. 1, 3–13 (2008).
25. See infra note 277.
26. See infra Part VI.
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different than the lawyer politician—whether those from a
specialized political class or a professionalized judicial
class—bring their own advantages and we should not
romanticize the lawyer politician (either historically or
certainly today).27 Yet, in a time when liberal democracy
seems under threat globally, and many express concern for
its health in the United States,28 there is an urgency in
exploring the role lawyer-politicians have played in
supporting the rule of law in the United States and the
implications of this group’s decline.
The plan of the Article is as follows. After a brief
discussion in Part I of its methodology, Part II examines the
historical data compiled for this Article on the occupational
background of members of the U.S. Congress as well as the
U.S. Executive. Part III puts forward a set of reasons for why
lawyers have traditionally dominated federal elected office
and Part IV lays out two arguments for lawyers’ relative
decline. Part V then examines the significance of the
prevalence, and decline, of lawyer-politicians in Congress
and the judiciary for the U.S. legal system. The Article
concludes in Part VI by exploring some of the potential
implications of this decline for the rule of law in the United
States.
I. METHODOLOGY
The information on the occupational background of
members of Congress for this Article spans from
27. For example, law, as a gateway profession into politics, may have limited
the number of women who were elected to higher office in the U.S. See infra
Section II.B. Also, judges’ ambition for elected higher office may negatively
influence their behavior. See infra Section V.B.1.
28. See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, America’s Democracy Has Become Illiberal,
WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/americais-becoming-a-land-of-less-liberty/2016/12/29/2a91744c-ce09-11e6-a747d03044780a02_story.html?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card&utm_term=.55f84f6c9891 (arguing that the United States is currently viewing
the rise of illiberal democracy in its own political system).
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Independence to the 114th Congress. The data for members
of the 1st to the 71st Congress was compiled over twentyyear periods by coding occupational information from the
biographies of members maintained in the official
Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress.29 The
Biographical Directory is partially incomplete on rare
occasions where members had no occupational information
listed,30 but the Directory provides a consistent,
authoritative, and relatively robust source of occupational
data on members of Congress across time.
Information on the occupational background of members
of Congress used for the 79th Congress to the 114th Congress
was drawn from data compiled by CQ Press.31 For
consistency, the occupational categories used by CQ Press—
law, business, banking, education, medicine—were also used
when coding members from the 1st to 71st Congresses.32
Members frequently had more than one occupation before
serving in Congress and this was coded both in the CQ Press
data and in the data compiled by the author of the earlier
Congresses.
Both because of its contemporary interest and to test the
robustness of the CQ Press data, the occupational profile of
each member of the 114th Congress was checked against
occupational information from member profiles from CQ Roll
Call, which is somewhat confusingly a separate entity from
CQ Press, along with official Congressional biographies.33

29. Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress, 1774–Present, U.S.
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp (last visited
June 8, 2017) [hereinafter Congressional Biographical Directory].
30. For example, Congressman James Israel Standifer has no occupation
listed prior to joining Congress even though he was forty-one years old when
elected to office. Id.
31. CQ Press, supra note 5.
32. For a list of occupations used by CQ Press, see infra note 60.
33. See Legislative & Advocacy Solutions for Professionals, CQ ROLL CALL,
https://www.google.com/search?q=CQ+Roll+call&rlz=1C1CHZL_enUS706US70
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Cleaned CQ Press data indicated that 36.5% of the 114th
Congress had previously been a lawyer.34 Individually crosschecking members’ profiles indicated that 39.1% of members
of the 114th Congress had a law degree. This discrepancy
may be because CQ Press coded for “law” only if the member
had practiced and not just if they had a law degree, because
the member’s law background was missed in the CQ Press
coding, or some other reason. Regardless, the difference
between the two findings is relatively small. Occupational
backgrounds other than law may have larger discrepancies.
For example, a member might not be coded in the CQ Press
data as working as a Congressional aide if they only did so
for a short period.35 However, these discrepancies should be
similar across time in the CQ Press data and small enough
to not effect drawing conclusions about more general trends
across the pre-1945 data sourced from the official
Congressional Biographical Directory and the post-1945 CQ
Press sourced data.36 In the pre-1945 data compiled by the
6&oq=CQ+Roll+call&aqs=chrome..69i57j0l5.3345j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UT
F-8 (last visited June 3, 2017) [hereinafter CQ ROLL CALL]; Congressional
Biographical Directory, supra note 29.
34. Some years of CQ Press data were missing occupational information. For
example, for the 1945–46 Congress, five members had no occupational
information listed. This missing data is more prevalent in more recent
Congresses. In the 114th Congress, seventy members had no occupational
background listed, which is far greater than any other Congress perhaps because
the data is still relatively recent. For instance, the 113th Congress was missing
occupational information for only six members. CQ Press, supra note 5. When no
occupational information was provided, the member was removed from the data
set to maintain consistency in coding.
35. See infra Section IV.A (describing inconsistencies in coding for
Congressional aides between CQ Press and CQ Roll Call data).
36. Today, the House of Representatives has 435 members and the Senate
members.
Members
of
the
U.S.
Congress,
CONGRESS.GOV,
100
https://www.congress.gov/members?q={%22congress%22:%22115%22}
(last
visited June 8, 2017). In all data sets for this Article, non-voting members in the
House of Representatives are not counted. During a Congressional term,
members may retire, die, or otherwise leave office and be replaced by new
members. If this occurs, the occupation of both the original and new member are
coded, meaning that for some Congresses, the data set may be larger than the
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author, if a member either studied or practiced law, they
were coded as having a law background.
One limitation of this data set is that it does not track
how long a member was in an occupation before entering
elected office or how long they were in another elected office
before becoming a member of Congress. Therefore, a member
who worked as a lawyer for two years is coded the same as
one who worked in a law practice for twenty years.
Nonetheless, the data is still indicative of the general
occupational background of members. For example, all
members coded for “law” at least went through legal training
and the vast majority likely practiced in some law setting for
at least a limited period.37
This Article also makes a unique contribution in
calculating the proportion of all presidents, vicepresidents,
and cabinet secretaries that have been lawyers. I coded this
data by examining the occupational background for all
persons holding these offices using official and unofficial
biographical sources.38
total allotted members of Congress.
37. Some of the CQ Press data on the occupational background of members of
Congress has been compiled elsewhere, See BROOKINGS, VITAL STATISTICS ON
CONGRESS, tbls. 1-8 & 1-12 (Apr. 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Rese
arch/Files/Reports/2013/07/vital-statistics-congress-mann-ornstein/Vital-Statist
ics-Chapter-1-Demographics-of-Members-of-Congress_UPDATE.pdf?la=en; R.
ERIC PETERSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS: TRENDS
IN MEMBER CHARACTERISTICS SINCE 1945 8–11 (2012). However, this data has not
yet been analyzed in a systematic manner or in an academic paper. Nor has this
CQ Press data been combined with earlier data of members of Congress from
before 1945 to provide a broader historical view of the occupational background
of members of Congress from Independence to the contemporary era.
38. The primary unofficial source used for occupational information about
cabinet secretaries was Wikipedia. While Wikipedia is generally not a preferred
source, studies have shown it to be generally as accurate as other reference
sources. Jim Giles, Special Report: Internet Encyclopedias Go Head to Head, 438
NATURE 900 (2005) (finding that selected articles on science in the online version
of Encyclopedia Britannica and Wikipedia were substantially similar in accuracy
as judged by a panel of experts). Wikipedia is also often the only available
consistent and centralized source of biographical information for many cabinet
secretaries.

2017] DECLINE OF THE LAWYER-POLITICIAN

667

Finally, the Article also draws on a variety of other
sources in its analysis of the impact of lawyers’ prevalence in
Congress including official voting records39 as well as donor
and wealth data from Open Secrets.40
II. LAWYERS IN POLITICS: THE U.S. CONGRESS
A. Lawyers’ Presence in Congress
Lawyers’ historic dominance of the U.S. political system
is striking even if it has waned over the last several decades.
59% of U.S. presidents have been lawyers although just four
of the last ten41 and 68% of vice presidents.42 Since
independence, some 63% of cabinet positions have been
occupied by lawyers, ranging from 100% of Attorney
Generals, 78% of Secretaries of State, 70% of Secretaries of
the Treasury, 25% of Secretaries of Veterans Affairs and 23%
of Secretaries of Labor.43 And all Supreme Court judges have
come from a law background.44

39. See infra Section IV.A.
40. Center for Responsive Politics, Interest Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/ (last visited June 9, 2017).
41. The Presidents, WHITE HOUSE,
Presidents (last visited June 9, 2017).

https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/

42. Congressional Biographical Directory, supra note 29 (searching for “VicePresidents”).
43. See infra Table 1.
44. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS,
DEVELOPMENTS 321–33 (2007) (providing the legal training of all U.S.
Supreme Court justices).
AND
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1. Percent of Lawyer Cabinet Members (1789–2016)45
Percent
Lawyers

Cabinet Position
Vice President (1789–2016)

68% (32 of 47)

Attorney General (1789–2016)

100% (82 of 82)

Secy State (1789–2016)

78% (53 of 68)

Secy. Treasury (1789–2016)

70% (52 of 74)

Secy. War (1789–1947)

74% (42 of 57)

Secy. Navy (1798–1947)

66% (31 of 47)

Postmaster General (1829–1971)

58% (31 of 53)

Secy. Interior (1849–2016)

69% (35 of 51)

Secy. Agriculture (1889–2016)

37% (11 of 30)

Secy. Commerce

(1903/1913–2016)46

Secy. Labor (1913–2016)

23% (6 of 26)

Secy. Defense (1947–2016)
Secy. Health and Human Services

37% (16 of 43)
25% (6 of 24)

(1953–2016)47

Secy. Housing and Urban Development (1965–2016)
Secy. Transportation (1966–2015)
Secy. Energy (1977–2015)

36% (8 of 22)
50% (8 of 16)
59% (10 of 17)
38% (5 of 13)

Secy. Education (1979–2015)

33% (3 of 9)

Secy. Veterans Affairs (1989–2016)

25% (2 of 8)

Secy. Homeland Security (2003–2016)
Total

100% (4 of 4)
63% (437 of 691)

45. “Cabinet-rank” officials, who are not cabinet members, are not included
in Table 1. For a list of cabinet and cabinet-rank positions, see The Cabinet,
WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/cabinet (last visited
June 8, 2017).
46. From 1903–13, there existed a Department of Commerce and Labor.
Jonathan Grossman, The Origin of the U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/dolorigabridge.htm (last visited June 9,
2017). The tally of lawyers who were Secretary of Commerce also includes the
four secretaries that were secretary of Commerce and Labor all of whom were
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The pervasiveness of lawyers in politics was already well
established at the nation’s founding. Twenty-five of fifty-six
of the signers of the Declaration of Independence were
lawyers,48 while 53% of the members of the 1st Congress
were trained in law.49 Although well represented in this
early period, the number of lawyers in Congress was to grow
markedly. It is difficult to emphasize enough how pervasive
lawyers were in the U.S. Congress through much of the
nineteenth century and well into the first half of the
twentieth. During this period, anywhere from 60% to almost
80% of the body was comprised of lawyers.50
To be a lawyer in the nineteenth century almost
inevitably drew one near elected office. For example, James
Gordon found in his study of the Kentucky Bar of 1850 that
28% of lawyers that he sampled in the state had held elected
office in the last five years.51 Similarly, drawing on historical
data from the American Bar Association, one can estimate

lawyers.
47. This tally for the Department of Health and Human Services also includes
the number of lawyers who served as secretary of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, which was in existence from 1953 to 1979 and was a
predecessor to both the Department of Health and Human Services and the
Department of Education. HHS Historical Highlights, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/about/historical-highlights/index.html (last visited
June 9, 2017).
48. U.S. Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin., Signers of the Declaration of
Independence,
ARCHIVES.GOV
https://www.archives.gov/files/founding-docs/
declaration_signers_gallery_facts.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2017).
49. See infra Section II.A, Table 2.
50. See infra Section II.A, Table 2.
51. James Gordon sampled 100 members of the Kentucky Bar in 1850. He
also found that in 1850–51, 34 of the 100 Representatives in the Kentucky House
were lawyers and 16 of the 38 Senators in the state Senate. Both the Governor
and Lieutenant Governor were also lawyers. On the basis of archival research,
Gordon found there were only 1,166 lawyers in the state at the time. This means
that in 1850, 1 out of every 22 lawyers in the state was a current member of the
state legislature, Governor or Lieutenant Governor. JAMES W. GORDON, LAWYERS
IN POLITICS: MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY KENTUCKY AS A CASE STUDY 121, 125–26,
233, 236 (Harold Hyman et al. eds., 1990).
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that in 1890, about one out of every 265 lawyers in the
country was a current member of Congress.52 Today, the
proportion of lawyers in the U.S. population is higher, but
only about one out of every 6,000 lawyers is a current
member of Congress.53 While the fraction of lawyers
currently in Congress is still striking, if one was a lawyer in
the nineteenth century, one was clearly part of a select
political elite. As De Tocqueville remarked in the early
nineteenth century, lawyers’ place in U.S. society was
comparable to that of a political “aristocracy.”54 It is a
position that lawyers have arguably never fully relinquished
even if, as a group, they have seen a relative decline in their
electoral fortunes.55

52. In 1890, there were an estimated 89,630 licensed lawyers in the country.
AM. BAR ASS’N, TOTAL NATIONAL LAWYER COUNTS, 1878–2013 (2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/t
otal_national_lawyer_counts_1878_2013.authcheckdam.pdf.
In
the
51st
Congress, there were 340 lawyers. Congressional Biographical Directory, supra
note 29.
53. In 2013, there were an estimated 1,268,011 licensed lawyers in the
country. AM. B. ASS’N, supra note 52. In the 114th Congress, there were 209
members with a law background. CQ Roll Call, supra note 33.
54. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 304 (“In America there are no nobles or
literary men, and the people is apt to mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently
form the highest political class . . . . If I were asked where I place the American
aristocracy, I should reply without hesitation, that it . . . occupies the judicial
bench and the bar.”).
55. Largely because of this pervasiveness, U.S. lawyers have been called “the
high priests of politics.” EULAU & SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 11.
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1. Percent of Members of Congress in Select
Occupations (1789–2015)56

FIGURE

Percentage of Members in Congress

90
80
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0

Selected Congressional Term
Law

Business or banking

Public service/ politics

Education

Agriculture

Congressional Aide

Medicine

Journalism

56. CQ Press, supra note 5; Congressional Biographical Directory, supra note
29.
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2. Percent of Members of Congress in Select
Occupations (1789–2016)57

TABLE

Occupation

1789–90

1809–11

1829–30

1849–50

1869–70

Law

52.6

48.0

69.0

79.5

70.2

Business or
banking

17.9

13.7

13.0

12.9

21.4

–

–

–

–

–

Education

6.3

4.4

3.9

8.2

7.2

Agriculture

21.1

17.2

12.0

11.0

9.2

–

–

–

–

–

4.2

6.4

5.3

4.1

2.6

Journalism

–

–

1.4

3.8

9

Real Estate

–

–

–

–

–

Public service/
politics

Congressional
Aide
Medicine

57. Occupational data of members of Congress from 1789–90 to 1929–30 was
compiled using the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress.
Congressional Biographical Directory, supra note 29. Data on members of
Congress from 1945 to 2016 is from CQ Press. CQ Press, supra note 5. For all
data compiled, a member of Congress or cabinet member is considered a lawyer
if they were trained in law or admitted to the bar whether or not they practiced.
Where a cell is left blank in the table, it is because the occupational information
was not recorded in the data set. Individual members of Congress may come from
multiple occupational backgrounds. Therefore, columns may add up to more than
100%.
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2 (continued)

1889–90

1909–10

1929–30

1945–46

1955–56

1965–66

75.4

71.3

63.2

55.7

55.1

57.5

19.3

26.8

26.2

25.1

27.1

22.5

–

–

–

9.1

12.2

13.7

9.1

10

9.4

17.1

17.3

17.0

9.1

9.2

10.6

11.9

13.4

11.0

–

–

–

2.7

5.0

5.9

0.7

0.8

2.1

2.8

1.8

1.3

6.2

9

8.6

8.9

7.6

6.6

–

–

4.0

2.5

3.5

2.9
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2 (continued)

Occupation

1975–76

1985–86

1995–96

2005–06

2015–16

Law

54.3

48.0

42.4

39.1

36.5

Business or
banking

22.4

30.0

30.6

27.8

25.5

Public service/
politics

13.9

10.4

25.0

24.6

23.0

Education

16.5

13.0

18.6

15.0

12.4

Agriculture

8.1

7.6

6.2

4.7

3.4

Congressional
Aide

5.1

7.4

9.5

9.2

8.4

Medicine

1.7

1.5

2.7

5.6

6.9

Journalism

4.6

5.4

4.6

2.6

2.1

Real Estate

3.5

5.0

6.2

5.1

4.7

There are four main occupational backgrounds from
which most members of Congress come: law, business,
education, and public service/politics.58 As Figure 1 and
Table 2 show, those from a law background still dominate
Congress, but not in the unrivaled manner they did in the
early part of the twentieth century with lawyers now
numbering less than 40% of members of Congress.59 This
gradual decline has not seen lawyers replaced with the entry
of a broad cross-section of Americans into the halls of

58. This Article examines some of the variation in the types of law
backgrounds of members of Congress as well as of public service/politics.
However, more work needs to be done to explore the diversity of other
occupational categories. For example, some members of Congress from a business
or banking background may have owned a small business, others worked as
middle management, while others were executives at large companies.
59. See supra Table 2.
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Congress. Instead, there has been the rise of a handful of new
groups that have successfully competed with lawyers.
Specifically, since World War II, there has been a marked
increase in the number of members who were part of a
specialized political class comprised of political aides and
members of civil society, which is demarcated above by
“public service/politics” and “congressional aide.” These will
be discussed in greater detail in Section IV.A of this Article.60
B. The Characteristics of Members of Congress from a Law
Background
Along a number of demographic and partisan measures
lawyer members of Congress are different than other
members more generally. Take gender—the data set on the
occupational background of members of Congress compiled
for this Article shows that female members of Congress are
historically less likely to come from a law background than
male members, although this gap has narrowed in recent
years.61 Female members may be less likely to be lawyers
60. Some occupational backgrounds tallied by CQ Press are not in Table 2 or
Figure 3 because a relatively small proportion of members were from that
background. These occupational backgrounds are: real estate, engineering,
clergy,
law
enforcement,
construction/building
trades,
aeronautics,
acting/entertainer, and computers/technology. CQ Press, supra note 5.
61. Of the thirty-one women who served in Congress before World War II,
only two were lawyers even though during this period lawyers constituted well
over half of members of Congress. People Search, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES:
HIST., ART &ARCHIVES, http://history.house.gov/People/Search?filter=6. (last
visited June 10, 2017). The historically low proportion of women lawyers in
Congress can partially be explained by the fact that some women members of
Congress inherited their political career from their husband—either taking over
their husband’s congressional seat when he died or continuing their electoral
campaign after his death. For example, of the twenty-four women in the 98th
Congress, five were women who were appointed or elected at least in part because
of the death of their spouse. Familial Connections of Women Representatives and
Senators in Congress, Women Who Directly Succeeded Their Late Husbands, U.S.
HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES:
HIST.,
ART
&
ARCHIVES,
http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/WIC/HistoricalData/Familial-Connections-of-Women-Representatives-and-Senators-inCongress/ (last visited June 10, 2017). Still, this leaves nineteen women,
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because of barriers women have historically faced both
attending law school and in the profession.62 Since law is a
traditional “gateway” occupation into politics, the hurdles
women have faced in law may be one factor that has
historically reduced women’s numbers in Congress.63

including three lawyers, whose success is not directly attributable to their
husband’s political career. If this smaller sample is used, then 16% of these
women in the 98th Congress were lawyers, which is still a statistically significant
difference with the number of male members of Congress who were lawyers
(p=.002). Similarly, in the 88th Congress, five women who served in Congress
had husbands who died either in Congress or while running for Congress. Id. If
these political wives are excluded, 12.5% of the remaining group were lawyers,
which is also a statistically significant difference (p=.008).
62. For more on the barriers women have faced in law, see Deborah Rhode,
From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms, 24 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1075–76 (2011). Less than 10% of those enrolled in JD
courses nationwide were women until the 1970s. AM. B. ASS’N, FIRST YEAR AND
TOTAL J.D. ENROLLMENT BY GENDER 1947–2011, http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/st
atistics/jd_enrollment_1yr_total_gender.authcheckdam.pdf. However, since the
early 1990’s, graduating classes at law schools have been about evenly split
between men and women, which may help explain why the gender gap among
lawyers in Congress has narrowed. Id.
63. For other potential factors, see Hill, supra note 14.
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TABLE 3.

Proportion of Male and Female Lawyer Members of
Congress64

Congress

Percent of Female Percent of Male
Members of
Members of
Congress Who are Congress Who are
Lawyers
Lawyers

Statistically
Significant
Difference?
(P<0.05)65

83rd
(1953–54)

7.7%
(1 of 13)

56.6%
(307 of 542)

Yes

88th
(1963–64)

7.7%
(1 of 13)

59.3%
(320 of 540)

Yes

93rd
(1973–74)

56.3%
(9 of 16)

54.7%
(297 of 541)

No

98th
(1983–84)

12.5%
(3 of 24)

51.2%
(265 of 518)

Yes

103rd
(1993–94)

13%
(7 of 54)

47.8%
(236 of 494)

Yes

108th
(2003–04)

20.8%
(15 of 72)

42.2%
(197 of 467)

Yes

113th
(2013–14)

33%
(33 of 100)

39%
(172 of 441)

No

64. CQ Press, supra note 5.
65. The list of the P-values for the following comparisons are as follows: 83rd
Congress p=0.00; 88th Congress p=0.00; 93rd Congress p=0.904; 98th Congress
p=0.00; 103rd Congress p=0.00; 108th Congress p=0.00; 113th Congress p=.255.
In recent Congresses, Democrats are more likely to be lawyers than Republicans
so this gender gap is even more striking. See supra Section II.B, Table 5.
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TABLE 4. Proportion of White and Racial Minority Lawyer
Members of Congress

Congress

Percent of
Minority
Members of
Congress Who
are Lawyers

Percent of White
Members of
Congress Who
are Lawyers

Statistically
Significant
Difference?
(P<0.05)

83rd
(1953–54)

75%
(3 out of 4)

55.2%
(304 of 551)

No

88th
(1963–64)

61.5%
(8 out of 13)

58%
(313 of 540)

No

93rd
(1973–74)

53.8%
(14 out of 26)

55%
(292 of 531)

No

98th
(1983–84)

30.5%
(11 out of 36)

50.8%
(257 of 506)

Yes

103rd
(1993–94)

37.5%
(24 out of 64)

44.8%
(217 of 484)

No

108th
(2003–04)

40.3%
(27 out of 67)

39%
(185 of 474)

No

113th
(2013–14)

40%
(34 out of 85)

37.4%
(171 of 457)

No

On the other hand, racial minorities including African
Americans, Hispanics, and Asians in Congress have
historically not been less likely to be a lawyer than other
members of Congress since World War II.66 This seems
counter-intuitive since both racial minorities and women
have faced discrimination and unequal representation
within the profession.67 The causes of this discrepancy
66. CQ Press, supra note 5.
67. The legal profession continues to struggle with diversity. In 2010, 88% of
lawyers were white, 5% African American, 4% Hispanic, and 3% Asian. AM. B.
ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/market_research/lawyer-demographics-tables-2015.auth
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deserve further research.
Lawyer-members of Congress are, as a group, also
different from their colleagues in their partisan affiliation.
In recent years, a larger percentage of Democrats, who are
members of Congress, have been lawyers than those who are
Republicans.68 In the 114th Congress, 43% of Democrats in
Congress had been trained in law compared to 31% of
Republicans while in the 109th Congress, it was 44% of
Democrats as compared to 34% of Republicans.69 While
Republican members of Congress are less often lawyers, this
does not mean constituents in districts that are won by
Republicans are more averse to voting for a lawyer. Rather,
there is evidence that lawyers in society are more likely to,
on average, lean towards the Democratic Party compared to
the Republican Party.70 As such, it may just be that there are
fewer Republican-leaning lawyers to run for office compared
to Democratic leaning lawyers interested in running for
office.

checkdam.pdf. Meanwhile, in 2013, the U.S. population was 63% white, 13%
African American, 17% Hispanic, and 5% Asian. U.S Census Quick Facts, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited
June 10, 2017).
68. See infra Table 5.
69. See infra Table 5.
70. Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton & Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of
American Lawyers 17 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law and Econ., Working Paper No.
732, 2015) (finding that lawyers are significantly more liberal than conservative).
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TABLE 5. Percentage of Occupational Backgrounds in the
114th and 109th Congresses by Political Party71

114th Congress
(2015–16)
Repub. Dem.

All

109th Congress
(2005–06)
Repub. Dem.

All

Law

31.2

42.7

36.5

33.7

44

38.4

Business or Banking

32.4

17.1

25.5

36.4

16.9

24.5

Public Service/ Politics

15.4

32.2

23

18.6

31

24.2

Education

6.3

19.4

12.4

11.7

18.1

14.7

Medicine

8.7

4.7

6.9

6.9

4

5.5

Congressional Aide

9.1

7.1

8.4

8.6

9.7

9.1

Lawyer-members of Congress come from a varied set of
legal careers. In the 114th Congress, forty-three members or
roughly 20% of lawyer-members of Congress were former
prosecutors72 and over half had spent some time in private
practice.73 Government service, such as working at a US
Attorney’s office, the State Attorney General’s Office, or for
a government department, was also common as was work for
nonprofits or activist causes.74 At least seven had been public
defenders.75 As will be discussed in greater detail in Section
V.B, previous experience as a judge, which was once
relatively common before World War II, has precipitously
declined and in the 114th Congress, only fifteen members
71. CQ Press, supra note 5.
72. JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMBERSHIP OF THE 114TH
CONGRESS: A PROFILE 3 (2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43869.pdf.
73. CQ Press, supra note 5; CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 33.
74. CQ Press, supra note 5; CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 33.
75. CQ Press, supra note 5; CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 33.
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had formerly been in a judicial office.76
Similarly, the graduates of certain law schools have been
disproportionately represented. In the 114th Congress, 209
entering members had a law degree.77 Harvard Law School
graduated nineteen of these members, more than any other
law school, with Georgetown University Law Center being
next, graduating fourteen.78 Other law schools were less
prolific, although it should be noted class sizes can vary
considerably among law schools.79 The University of Virginia
and the University of Texas graduated seven, Yale and
Boston College five, NYU four, and the University of
Michigan four.80 Nationally, prominent law schools like
Stanford, the University of Chicago, the University of
Pennsylvania, Duke, and Berkeley all graduated only 1
member of the 114th Congress each, and others produced
none.81
Finally, there have been significant regional variations
in which states are most likely to elect lawyer-members of
Congress. Strikingly, the South has historically had a
disproportionate number of members of Congress who are
lawyers as well as members who were former judges.82 This
is true despite the South not having more lawyers per

76. CQ Press, supra note 5; CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 33.
77. CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 33.
78. Id.
79. For example, both Harvard and Georgetown are large law schools, with
class sizes between 500 and 600 students, while Yale or the University of Chicago
have between 150 and 200 students in each graduating class. For a current list
of total enrollment in law schools, see Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools
/top-law-schools/law-rankings?int=a1d108 (last visited June 8, 2017).
80. CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 33.
81. Columbia Law School, for example, does not have a graduate in the 114th
Congress. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., supra note 79.
82. See infra Table 6; Congressional Biographical Directory, supra note 29.
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capita.83 This pattern is noticeable since at least the
beginning of the twentieth century84 and has continued to
recent Congresses although Table 6 indicates in the 114th
Congress, the Northeast elected more lawyers than the
South.85
This discrepancy in the rate of electing lawyers between
different regions is even more conspicuous when examining
specific states. For example, from 1945 to 2015, California
had 414 representatives in Congress of which 29% were
lawyers, while Alabama had seventy-four members in
Congress of which 70% were lawyers.86
This regional discrepancy is also true of judges. For
example, in the 114th Congress, of the fifteen members of
Congress who had held judicial positions, all but two were
from the South and six were from Texas.87 This is a pattern
which begins much earlier in the nation’s history. In the 71st
Congress, for instance, of the fifty-two members of Congress
who were former judges twenty-seven, or 52%, were from the
South.88

83. In 2014, of the eleven states in the Northeast, only Maine and New
Hampshire had fewer lawyers than the national median of 305 per 100,000 for
states. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY: LAWYER
POPULATION BY STATE (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/market_research/national-lawyer-population-by-state-2015.
authcheckdam.pdf. Of the fourteen states in the South, ten had fewer lawyers
than the national median—Texas, Florida, Oklahoma, and Louisiana had more.
Id.
84. For example, in the 61st Congress of 1909–10, 71% of members of
Congress were lawyers. CQ Press, supra note 5. Meanwhile, 78% of members
from Southern states were lawyers compared with 68% from non-Southern
states. CQ Press, supra note 5.
85. See infra Table 6.
86. CQ Press, supra note 5.
87. CQ Press, supra note 5; CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 33.
88. Congressional Biographical Directory, supra note 29.
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TABLE 6. Percent of Elected Members of Congress Who Are
Lawyers from Different Regions of the United States

114th
Congress
(2015–16)

109th
Congress
(2005–06)

104th
Congress
(1995–96)

All Members
of Congress
(1945–2015)

West89

28.4%

28.7%

34.1%

34.3%

South90

42.2%

42.9%

51.1%

53.6%

Northeast91

50.0%

39.6%

40%

48.1%

Midwest92

35.1%

40.8%

41.7%

43.9%

Nat'l Average

39.0%

38.4%

42.5%

45.8%

89. Includes members of Congress from: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Montana, North Dakota, New Mexico, Nevada,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
90. Includes members of Congress from: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
91. Includes members of Congress from: Connecticut, Delaware,
Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
92. Includes members of Congress from: Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Missouri, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
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2. Percent of Congressional Delegation (1945–2015)
that are Lawyers93
FIGURE

Part of the reason the South elects more former judges,
and by extension lawyers, to Congress is likely structural. In
the South, many judges have also historically been
administrators or executive officials. In Texas, for example,
county judges are still considered the chief executive of the
county as well as frequently having broad judicial duties.94
Another part of the reason that the South elects more
lawyers may be cultural and historical. John Baker has
found evidence that, particularly in the 1950s before the
professionalization of many state legislatures, states with a
more traditionalistic political culture, such as those in the
South, were more likely to have representatives of higher
occupational status in their legislatures, which may help

93. CQ Press, supra note 5.
94. DAVID B. BROOKS, TEXAS ASS’N COUNTIES, GUIDE TO TEXAS LAW FOR
COUNTY OFFICIALS (2016), https://county.org/member-services/legal-resources/
publications/Documents/Guide-to-Laws-for-County-Officials.pdf.
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explain the prevalence of lawyer-politicians in the South.95
III. EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS OF LAWYERS
This section puts forward five arguments for why
lawyers have historically dominated the U.S. Congress and
U.S. electoral politics more generally: lawyers’ prevalence in
U.S. society; self-selection and professional incentives; a
politicized legal system; comparatively better access to
resources to run for office; and demand from voters for
lawyer politicians. While not exhaustive, taken together
these arguments provide a compelling explanation for
lawyers’ traditional electoral success.
A. More Lawyers in the United States
While many democracies elect a large number of lawyers
to public office, the United States elects among the most.96
Part of the reason behind this phenomenon is likely that
there are more lawyers per capita in the United States than
most other countries.97 As of 2013, about 0.4% of the United
States population was a lawyer.98 In Canada, which also has
95. John Baker, Exploring the “Missing Link”: Political Culture as an
Explanation of the Occupational Status and Diversity of State Legislators in
Thirty States, 43 WESTERN POL. Q. 597, 608 (1990).
96. See MARK C. MILLER, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE ROLE
LAWYERS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 60 (1995) (finding that of 14
countries surveyed, the United States had the most lawyer-members of national
legislatures of any country except Colombia); There Was a Lawyer, An Engineer,
and a Politician . . . , ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 2009), http://www.economist.com/
node/13496638 (finding that lawyers were well-represented in the elected bodies
of democracies, but that the United States proportionally had the most lawyers
of those democracies surveyed).
OF

97. A 2006 study of twenty-six countries in Europe, Canada, the United
States, and Japan found that the United States had more lawyers per capita than
all the others except Greece. CLIFFORD WINSTON, ROBERT W. CRANDALL & VIKRAM
MAHESHRI, FIRST THING WE DO, LET’S DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS 26 (2011).
98. Compare AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY:
HISTORICAL TREND IN TOTAL NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION 1875–2015 (2015),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/t
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a relatively high proportion of lawyers, it was 0.33%.99 In
other words, there are about 1.2 times as many lawyers in
the United States per capita as in Canada.100 Approximately
17.4% of the 40th Parliament in Canada were lawyers.101 If
this ratio were increased by 121%, to more closely parallel
the lawyer population ratio of the United States, than the
Canadian Parliament would be 21.1% lawyers. This is still
far below levels of lawyer representation in the U.S.
Congress, but it is closer. Still, the large per capita number
of lawyers in the United States does not explain why lawyers
in many countries disproportionately go into politics in the
first place, or why lawyers are more numerous in the U.S.
Congress compared to other countries even when taking into
account the comparatively larger number of lawyers in the
United States.
B. Self-selection and Professional Incentives
One clear potential explanation for the prevalence of

otal_national_lawyer_counts_1878_2015.authcheckdam.pdf, with U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, MONTHLY POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR THE UNITED STATES: APRIL 1, 2010
TO DECEMBER 1, 2014 (2014), http://www.census.gov/popest/data/national/totals/
2015/index.html.
99. Compare FED’N LAW SOC’YS CAN. STATISTICAL REPORT (2013),
http://flsc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/2012-statistical-report.pdf,
with
STATISTICS CAN., CANADA’S TOTAL POPULATION ESTIMATES 2013 (2013),
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/demo02a-eng.htm.
100. Compare Congressional Biographical Directory supra note 29, with CQ
Press, supra note 5.
101. In the 40th House of Commons, there were a total of 315 members of
which fifty, or 15.9%, were lawyers. Occupations of Members of the House of
Commons, PARLIAMENT CAN., http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/compilations/
HouseOfCommons.aspx?Menu=HoC (last visited June 8, 2017). In the 40th
Senate, there were 123 Senators of whom twenty-six were lawyers or 21.1%
Occupations of Senators, PARLIAMENT CAN., https://lop.parl.ca/ParlInfo/Lists/
Occupation.aspx?Menu=HOC-Bio&Section=b571082f-7b2d-4d6a-b30a-b6025a9c
bb98&Parliament=8714654b-cdbf-48a2-b1ad-57a3c8ece839&Name=&Party=
&Province=&Gender=&CurrentParliamentarian=False&Occupation=&Occupat
ionType= (last visited June 8, 2017). In other words, seventy-six of 438, or 17.4%,
members of Parliament in Canada were lawyers.
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lawyers in electoral politics is that the practice of law
naturally orients lawyers towards politics. As such, lawyers
are more likely to think about running for office than others.
According to a 2002 Knowledge Networks survey, only 5% of
the U.S. population has ever considered running for elected
office.102 However, in a survey conducted in 2001 and again
in 2008 of persons from the four backgrounds of persons most
likely to have considered running for elected office—lawyers,
business leaders, educators, and political activists—those
from a law or activist background were most likely to have
considered running for office, with 58% of lawyers and 71%
of activists surveyed having considered it.103
Part of the reason lawyers might think of running for
office at a higher rate is their frequent interactions with the
political process. After political activists, lawyers were the
most likely of the four occupations surveyed to report having
attended a state legislative meeting, interacted with an
elected official socially or as part of their job, or having an
elected official as a family member or as a friend.104 Lawyers
and political activists were also the most likely of the groups
surveyed to think of themselves as qualified to run.105
This self-confidence about their political abilities comes
in part from their education. Lawyers are trained in
interpreting, crafting, and arguing about law in an often
highly competitive environment. As one commentator on the
U.S. legal profession observed, “[t]here has always been a
strong link between the legal profession and elected office.
Lawyers tend to view themselves as the architects of our
102. JENNIFER LAWLESS, BECOMING A CANDIDATE: POLITICAL AMBITION AND THE
DECISION TO RUN FOR OFFICE 24 (2011) (stating that less than 1% of Americans
have ever run for elected office).
103. Id. at 107 (also finding 34% of business leaders also considered running
for office and 40% of educators).
104. Id. at 116.
105. Id. at 119 (finding 61% of lawyers surveyed thought they were qualified
or very qualified for elected office whereas 60% of activists felt similarly).
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modern political system, both writing the laws as well as
interpreting them.”106 Given this context, it perhaps should
be expected that those who have developed these skills in
this environment would then be more likely to pursue a
career in politics.107
There is also evidence that those who go into law have
traditionally been more interested in politics in the first
place. Eulau and Sprague found in their 1957 survey of four
state legislatures that legislators who were lawyers were
significantly more likely to report that they became
interested in politics in childhood than legislators who were
not lawyers.108 Those who are interested in politics at an
early age may be more likely to view a legal career as both
being a historic gateway into politics and a practical platform
from which to run.109
Law also provides unique professional incentives to run
for office. Holding elected office, particularly at the state
level, where legislative roles have traditionally been parttime, can help many lawyers further their legal careers by
giving these lawyers expanded professional networks, a
106. Harvard Law Sch. Ctr. on the Legal Profession, Running for—or from—
Office? New Lawyers Face Tough Choices, THE PRACTICE (Nov. 2015),
https://thepractice.law.harvard.edu/article/running-for-or-from-office/.
107. A predilection for competition has been hypothesized as one possible
factor that influences who will run for office. Kristin Kanthak & Jonathan Woon,
Women Don’t Run? Election Aversion and Candidate Entry 59 AM. J. POL. SCI.
595 (2015) (arguing that women are less likely to become political candidates
because they are less likely than men to take part in competitive elections
compared to volunteering to be a randomly chosen representative). Law may
train practitioners to be competitive giving them an edge in electoral politics.
108. EULAU & SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 57. For example, 53% of lawyer
legislators in California said they became interested in politics in childhood while
only 34% of non-lawyer legislators said the same. Id. Lawyer legislators in the
four states studied were also more likely than non-lawyer legislators to say family
members were a source of political socialization, that they had family members
in politics, or that educational experience was the source of their political
interest. Id. at 58–61.
109. See id. at 54–55 (“’Law,’ he wrote, ‘is of course the business which best fits
in with politics.’”).
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raised profile, and the ability to attract more clients, either
while they are holding office or afterwards.110 This
advantage to elected office was particularly prominent
historically, when states barred lawyer advertisement and so
politics was a way to spread the word among potential clients
about one’s practice.111
In general, law is often different than many occupations,
where taking time off to run for and hold office could be an
obstacle from achieving further success in one’s field. As Max
Weber noted in the early twentieth century, lawyers have
traditionally had more flexible careers that allow them to
take time away from their practice for politics.112 Being in
elected office also allows a lawyer to stay up-to-date on
legislative changes113 and, at least in part-time state
legislative work, can serve as a supplemental source of
income during lean years of practice.114 Having previously
held elected office can be a valuable prestige marker in the
legal profession in a way that it may not be in other
occupations providing a potential gateway for legal or quasilegal positions in government or other lines of business after
110. Joseph Schlesinger, Lawyers and American Politics: A Clarified View, 1
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 26, 27 (1957) (noting that the legal profession is compatible
with politics as lawyers can return to practice from politics with few professional
costs).
111. EULAU & SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 43–44 (making a similar observation
about lawyer advertisements in the mid-20th century).
112. In Politics as a Vocation, Max Weber observed that one either needed to
survive off of politics or, alternatively, have an independent source of income.
Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77,
84–85 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946). He argued that
landowners, who collected rent, could engage in politics, but it was more difficult
for a large-scale entrepreneur, who needed to tend to his business. Id. at 85. As a
result, he claimed “[f]or purely organizational reasons, it is easier for the lawyer
to be dispensable; and therefore the lawyer has played an incomparably greater,
and often even a dominant, role as a professional politician.” Id.
113. DONALD R. MATTHEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD 34–35 (1960)
(observing, “[t]he law changes relatively slowly, and a politician is in a position
to keep up with many of the changes in the law while active in politics”).
114. EULAU & SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 43.
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office. For example, there is some evidence members of the
U.S. Congress, who are lawyers, go into lobbying after
leaving office at a higher rate than other members.115
C. A Politicized Legal System
Compared to those from other occupations, lawyers in
the United States have one very distinct advantage in
electoral politics: there are simply more public, and
specifically more elected, offices available to them.116 The
United States is exceptional amongst democracies in having
elections in most of its states for many of its prosecutors,
judges, and state attorney generals.117 Lawyers monopolize
115. Of the 119 members of Congress who left the 111th Congress (2008–10),
46 (or 39%) later became lobbyists. Revolving Door: Former Members of the 111th
Congress,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/
departing.php?cong=111 (last visited June 6, 2017). Of the members who left the
111th Congress, 50 were lawyers. Compare id., with CQ Press, supra note 5. Of
these lawyers, 60% became lobbyists, while 40% did not. Compare
OPENSECRETS.ORG, supra note 115, with CQ Press, supra note 5.
116. Paul L. Hain & James E. Pierson, Politics Revisited: Structural
Advantages of Lawyer Politicians, 19 AM. J. POL. SCI. 41, 41 (1975) (finding that
lawyers move to other positions after their time in the state legislature at a
higher rate than non-lawyers and this is a result of their ability to advance
through “lawyers-only positions”); Schlesinger, supra note 110, at 26 (noting
lawyers’ advantage in politics may arise from their monopoly of offices related to
the administration of justice).
(2011),
117. U.S. DEP’T JUST., STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 5
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco11.pdf (finding in 75% of U.S. states and
the District of Columbia, judges are required to be elected at the trial level for
their initial term and, in 90% of states, for their subsequent term as well as the
fact that in 48% of states and the District of Columbia, judges are elected at the
appellate level for their initial term and, in 81% of states, for their subsequent
term); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 2, (2005),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf (noting that in 2005, only
Connecticut, Alaska, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia did not have
elected chief prosecutors—district attorney, county attorney, state’s attorney
general, or prosecuting attorney); JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S
COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 5 (2012) (finding just one
lower court in France that relied on popular elections for judicial selection and
noting that major democracies around the world had turned judicial selection
over to judges and judicial selection committees); Michael Ellis, The Origins of
the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE. L.J. 1528 (2012) (noting that no other country
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these elected positions in the justice system as well as
appointed legal positions, which provide them more paths to
higher office than are available to non-lawyers. Ironically, it
was populist campaigns that created elections for many of
these positions in the justice system hoping in part to create
more voter accountability over lawyers in these offices.118
However, an unintended consequence of these elections may
have been that it gave lawyers an advantage compared to
non-lawyers in politics, which arguably helped ensure that
an elite legal class dominated political life in the United
States more generally. Lawyers simply have more options of
elected offices to run for, practice in running campaigns, and
high-profile elected and unelected offices from which to wage
the next campaign.
The presence of former state attorney generals in the
U.S. Senate provides a useful illustration of how lawyers
may benefit from this monopoly. Eight members of the 114th
Congress, all in the Senate, were former state attorney
generals.119 Besides a governorship, state attorney generals
are arguably the most prominent statewide office one can
hold in state politics. The position of state attorney general
is exclusive to lawyers, an office which is elected in fortythree states.120 It then provides these lawyers who are
attorney generals a platform with high political visibility
besides the U.S. has elected prosecutors.).
118. Ellis, supra note 117, at 1531 (“Supporters of elected prosecutors [in the
nineteenth century] argued that popular election would give citizens greater
control over government, eliminate patronage appointments, and increase the
responsiveness of prosecutors to the communities they served.”). Judges in the
United States were elected starting in 1831 and in most states by 1862. Matthew
Streb, The Study of Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING
POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 1, 9 (2007).
119. CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 33.
120. Patrick Jonsson, Two Attorney Generals Indicted in One Week: What Gets
Top Cops in Trouble?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 8, 2015),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2015/0808/Two-attorneys-generalindicted-in-one-week-What-gets-top-cops-in-trouble (noting that forty-three
states have elected state attorney generals).
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upon which to campaign for further elected office.121 In the
114th Congress, 51% of the Senate had a law background
compared to just 35% of the House of Representatives, which
continues a pattern of lawyers being more prevalent in the
Senate than the House.122 Part of this discrepancy may be
explained by lawyers’ monopolization of state attorney
general positions. For instance, if lawyers who had been
state attorney generals were removed from the Senate and
replaced with non-lawyers, then the Senate would be full of
only 43% lawyers, a figure much closer to the proportion of
lawyers in the House.123
Generally, prosecutorial positions, while not providing
as prominent a position as a state attorney general, benefit
lawyers’ electoral chances in a similar manner. Being a
District Attorney, U.S. Attorney, or other prosecutor
provides a track record of public service and a platform of
fighting for law and order from which to run for further
office.124 Not all these positions are elected,125 but many are,
and there is an accepted understanding in the United States
that a prosecutor position is a gateway for a larger political
career. In support of this belief, one need to look no further
than Congress. Twenty-five percent of lawyers in the 114th

121. William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorney
Generals, and Lessons from the Divided Executive 115 YALE L. J. 2442, 2453
(2006) (“the Office of the Attorney General has long been seen by many of its
occupants as a stepping stone to the Governor’s office”).
122. CQ Press, supra note 5. Since 1945, about 44% of all members of the House
of Representatives have been lawyers while 57% of the Senate have been lawyers.
Id.
123. Id.
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
13,
2010),
124. Prosecutor
or
Politician?,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/01/prosecutor_or_pol
itician (“For many aspiring politicians [in the United States], the position of
prosecutor has become a stepping stone to higher office”).
125. See e.g., U.S. Attorneys Manual Title 3-2.120: Appointment, DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-3-2000-united-states-attorneys-ausasspecial-assistants-and-agac#3-2.100 (last visited June 10, 2017).
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Congress had previously held a prosecutorial position.126
Judgeships have also historically given lawyers another
platform to monopolize from which they can pursue further
office although, as discussed in more detail in Section V.B,
this pathway has been declining in use. Twenty-eight
percent of the lawyer-members of the first U.S. Congress had
previously been a judge.127 Lawyer-member comprised about
22% in the 21st Congress of 1829–30, 16% in 1869–70; 14%
in 1929–30, and 7% in 2013–14.128 The high prevalence of
former judges in the early Congresses may have been
because there were a limited number of prominent lawyers
in the early Republic so they were more likely to occupy a
number of key positions. Also, political leaders considered
many state and local judgeships patronage positions, before
they became elected offices, and so were often awarded to
political insiders with further political ambitions.129 Over
time though, as Section V.B claims, a change in social norms
and a move toward merit commissions in appointing judges
has made it less likely judges will enter politics.130
Not only have lawyers’ political fortunes benefited from
a set of elected and unelected legal offices they monopolize,
but the bar and court system, more generally, have
historically been deeply embedded in U.S. politics. Judges in
the nineteenth century were well known for developing the
common law in the absence of statutory law, and today,
judges are still central to resolving many of the largest

126. CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 33.
127. Congressional Biographical Directory, supra note 29.
128. Id.
129. SHUGERMAN, supra note 117, at 6 (finding judicial elections were adopted
in the U.S. in response to the earlier “partisan patronage politics of
appointments” that was perceived to limit judicial independence).
130. Id. at 6–7; CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 33. In Australia, there has been a
similar story of a declining number of politicians as judges. Douglas McDonald,
Politicians
as
Judges,
AUSTRALIAN PUB. L.
(Aug.
13,
2015),
http://auspublaw.org/2015/08/politicians-as-judges/.
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political disputes in the country and crafting policy.131 As
James Gordon has argued, the practice of law in the United
States has historically been “the adjustment, in a structured
and peaceful fashion, of conflicts between individuals or
interests. . . . The lawyer who saw himself as a facilitator of
consensus in the face of conflict was drawn to the political
arena because it was the battlefield upon which the most
complicated and knotty issues in American life had to be
resolved.”132
The politicization of the U.S. legal system has been both
deep and wide, providing elected and unelected positions
exclusively to lawyers in a legal system that orients lawyers
towards public life and resolving political disputes. It should
not be surprising that lawyers have found such fertile ground
for a broader political career.
D. Access to Resources
Lawyers also benefit from having access to more
resources than most Americans. Some of these resource
advantages are personal. Lawyers earn more than typical
Americans,133 come from more “elite” family backgrounds,134
and frequently have flexibility in their careers to take

131. See generally ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921)
(providing a famous account of the role of judge-made law in the Anglo-American
tradition).
132. GORDON, supra note 51, at 77–78.
133. The mean salary for lawyers in 2014 was $133,470 while the mean salary
for the average U.S. worker in 2014 was $47,230. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Occupational Employment Statistics: May 2014 National Occupational
Employment and Wage Estimates United States, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm#00-0000 (last visited June 10, 2017).
134. Quoctrung Bui, Who Had Richer Parents, Doctors or Artists?, PLANET
MONEY (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2014/03/18/289013884/
who-had-richer-parents-doctors-or-arists (using a government longitudinal study
that tracked 12,000 Americans, which found that lawyers had, on average, the
highest household income during childhood of any occupation tracked including
CEOs, doctors, and financial analysts).
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significant time off to engage in politics.135
Lawyers also have professional resources they can draw
upon. They can solicit campaign contributions from their
broader professional network, which can include the
business community, wealthy individuals, and unions.136
They also receive contributions from other lawyers. In the
113th Congress, members of the House of Representatives,
who were lawyers, received 7.3% of their contributions from
lawyers compared to 4.7% for other members.137 As such,
members of Congress, who were lawyers, received 55% more
contributions from lawyers than their peers.138 Lawyerpoliticians can then leverage these advantages in campaign
contributions, personal wealth, and flexibility in their career
for electoral benefit.
E. Demand for Lawyer Politicians
Finally, part of the reason why lawyers might dominate
Congress is because the public may perceive them to be
better representatives than those from other occupations. In
their profession, lawyers frequently have to deal with similar
issues as in politics such as debating what makes a just
society, the balancing of different social interests, and
arbitrating between opposed parties.139 Before the
135. WEBER, supra note 112, at 85.
136. A Presidential Run: A Conversation with Larry Lessig, PRACTICE (Nov.
2015) (noting that lawyers, as a social group, generally “have the biggest
Rolodexes” to fund campaigns).
137. Compare Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 40, with CQ Press,
supra note 5.
138. Compare Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 40, with CQ Press,
supra note 5.
139. EULAU & SPRAGUE, supra note 6 at 99 (arguing that the modern lawyer is
not so much an advocate as a negotiator and that this may translate well onto
the political stage); Schlesinger, supra note 110, at 31 (noting lawyers held in
prestige as skilled arbitrators of social conflict with special skills in debate);
ECONOMIST, supra note 96 (“The law deals with the same sort of questions as
politics: what makes a just society; the balance between liberty and security, and
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widespread adoption of legislative aides, representatives
frequently had to craft and work on proposed laws
themselves.140 As such, members of the public might
reasonably conclude that lawyers were technically better
equipped and professionally more inclined toward politics
and lawmaking than those from other backgrounds.141
Despite widespread negative stereotypes of lawyers,142
the public has also traditionally viewed law as a highprestige occupation143 and individual lawyers are often very
well respected within their communities. Some voters may
even perceive lawyers as having a desirable independence
from business and other vested interests. As Alexis de

so on. Lawyerly skills—marshalling evidence, appealing to juries, command of
procedure—transfer well to the political stage.”).
140. Congress had almost no staff at the end of World War I. By 1930, the
House had 870 employees and the Senate 280. By 1947, this had increased to a
combined total of 2,030. By 1976, it was 10,190. This number has remained
relatively steady to the present. By 2010, there was 11,397 staff. Vital Statistics
on Congress: Staffs of Members of the House and Senate, 1890–2010, BROOKINGS,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2013/07/vitalstatistics-congress-mann-ornstein/Vital-Statistics-Chapter-5-CongressionalStaff-and-Operating-Expenses_UPDATE.pdf?la=en (last visited June 10, 2017).
141. EULAU & SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 15–16 (noting lawyers prominence in
politics is ascribed, in part, to lawyers technical competence in law).
142. See generally MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND
LEGAL CULTURE (2006) (detailing a long tradition of making fun of lawyers
through jokes).
143. Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel & Peter H. Rossi, Occupational Prestige
in the United States, 1925–63, 70 AM. J. SOC. 286, 290 (1964) (finding that law
was a high prestige profession in the 1960s); Prestige Scores for All Detailed
Categories in the 1980 Census Occupational Classification, NAT’L OPINION
RESEARCH
CTR.,
http://ibgwww.colorado.edu/~agross/NNSD/prestige%20
scores.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2017) (using the 1989 General Social Survey,
the study found that lawyers have a prestige score of 74.77, which is well above
that of most other listed occupations). However, a 2014 Harris poll found lawyers
tied for the 10th most prestigious occupation out of 23 surveyed behind police
officers and nurses. Doctors, Military Officers, Firefighters, and Scientists Seen
as Among America’s Most Prestigious Occupations, HARRIS POLL (Sept. 10, 2014),
http://www.theharrispoll.com/politics/Doctors__Military_Officers__Firefighters_
_and_Scientists_Seen_as_Among_America_s_Most_Prestigious_Occupations.ht
ml.
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Tocqueville famously noted, “[i]n America there are no
nobles or literary men, and the people are apt to mistrust the
wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political
class.”144 In this view, lawyers are more like Anthony
Kronman’s “lawyer statesmen”—above the fray, providing
wise counsel, and worthy of a citizen’s trust and vote,145
while being aligned with middle class interests and values.146
Such a stylized view of lawyers’ position in the United
States is almost certainly overly optimistic. However, while
there are clearly stereotypes of ambulance chasing lawyers,
there are also well-known images of lawyers as advocates for
civil rights or the marginalized, statesmen, or law and order
prosecutors, which lawyer candidates benefit from when
they run for office.
III. LAWYERS’ ELECTORAL DECLINE
In recent years, the proportion of lawyers in the U.S.
Congress has hit an all-time low.147 There is also evidence of
a similar general decline in lawyer representatives in state
legislatures.148 This decline of lawyers in the U.S. Congress,
and politics more broadly, is all the more striking because
there are now more lawyers in the United States than ever
before, both in overall numbers and as a percent of the
population.149 This Part argues that at least two factors are

144.

DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra

note 1 at 278.

145. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal
Profession 3 (1993).
146. MILLER, supra note 96, at 72–73 (detailing arguments that lawyers are
representatives of a middle class society).
147. See supra Table 2.
148. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Lawyers, Democracy, and Dispute Resolution: The
Declining Influence of Lawyer-Statesmen Politicians and Lawyerly Values, 5
NEVADA L. J. 479, 485 (2005) (finding that in 6 of 8 state legislatures studied,
there was a decline in the prevalence of lawyer representatives between 1950 and
2000).
149. There were 1,268,011 licensed lawyers in the United States in 2013;
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driving this decline in electoral dominance: the rise of
competing political elites and changes in the legal profession
itself.
A. The Rise of a Specialized Political Class
It might seem obvious that lawyers would face new
challenges to their electoral dominance in an era when more
Americans are educated than ever before.150 However, it is
not a broad cross-section of Americans that is dethroning
lawyers, but rather a handful of occupational groups that are
challenging their dominance; in particular, the ascent of a
specialized political class that provides an alternative
gateway to electoral office.
After World War II, the United States witnessed an
increase in the number of legislative, executive, and
campaign aides,151 the expansion of lobbying, the
development of think tanks,152 and a greater
professionalization of public interest work.153 In other words,
574,810 in 1980; 221,605 in 1950; 114,460 in 1900; and 64,137 in 1880. AM. B.
ASS’N, supra note 52. In 1980, the population of the United States was about
226,500,000; in 1950, 151,300,000; in 1900, 76,000,000; and, in 1880, 50,000,000.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION, HOUSING UNITS, AREA MEASUREMENTS, AND
DENSITY: 1790 TO 1990
(Aug.
27,
1993),
http://www.census.gov/
population/www/censusdata/files/table-2.pdf. In other words, lawyers were .4% of
the population in 2013; .25% in 1980; .15% in 1950; .15% in 1900; and .13% in
1880. Compare AM. B. ASS’N, supra note 52, with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note
149.
150. In 1950, 34% of the U.S. population had graduated four years of high
school. By 2000, this was 80%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATION 158 (2007).
151. BROOKINGS, supra note 140.
152. THOMAS MEDVETZ, THINK TANKS IN AMERICA 5–8 (2012) (describing the rise
of think tanks in the United States, particularly their rapid expansion from the
1960s onwards).
153. The nonprofit sector of the U.S. economy was relatively small until the
1960s when Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society helped spur the creation of many
new non-profits, many of which benefited from increased government funding. It
is estimated that over 70% of the nonprofits that exist today were created since
the 1960s. KELLY LEROUX & MARY K. FEENY, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND
CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE UNITED STATES 59 (2015). For more on the
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a thick ecosystem of full-time jobs was created that revolved
around the political process, particularly in Washington D.C.
and state capitals across the country. Lawyers occupied
many of these new positions, but one did not have to be a
lawyer to succeed in these new career paths. Indeed, most
members of Congress from this professional background are
not lawyers.154
Those in this specialized political class have many, if not
more, of the advantages of lawyers in charting a route to
elected office. While not possible here, a closer study of those
in specialized political class would likely show that they have
frequent interaction with elected officials, the potential to
access a politicized donor base through their professional
work, an intimate knowledge of the political system and
policy issues, and a career that both allows for flexibility to
run for elected life and which would likely be furthered by
holding elected office. Indeed, many in this political class
might even benefit from running for office and losing,
because, in the campaign process, they inevitably gain name
recognition and connections that they can then leverage into
other political-related jobs. This ecosystem of positions
allows those in this specialized political class to sustain
themselves both inside and outside elected office during the
course of a larger career in and around politics.

professionalization of nonprofit work, see Walter Powell & Hokyu Hwang, The
Rationalization of Charity: The Influences of Professionalism in the Nonprofit
Sector, 54 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 268 (2009).
154. In the 114th Congress, of the 125 members from a politics/public service
background, thirty-four were also lawyer, while twenty-seven of the eighty-one
members, who were former Congressional Aides, were also lawyers. CQ Press,
supra note 5.
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3. Percent of Members of Congress in Select
Occupations (1945–2015)155
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Figure 3 above shows the rise of those from a public
service/politics background in Congress, with a particular
spike from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s. The CQ Press data
on which Figure 3 is based classifies public service/politics
and Congressional Aide separately even though
Congressional Aide arguably ought to be considered a subcategory of public service/politics.156 According to this data,
in the 114th Congress, 29% of members either had a
Congressional Aide or a public service/politics background,

155. Id.
156. Thirteen of forty-five members of Congress, who were listed as having a
background as a Congressional Aide, also were listed with a background of public
service/politics” in 2015–16. Id.
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which makes this combined grouping more prevalent than
business or banking.157
The number of persons coming from a Congressional aide
background is actually under-represented in the chart above.
According to compiled CQ Press data, which the chart uses,
8.5% of the 114th Congress, or forty-five members, had the
occupational background of Congressional aide.158 However,
supplementing this data with CQ Roll Call data and an
independent search of members of Congress biographical
profiles, eighty-one members, or 15%, had once been a
Congressional Aide.159 This discrepancy may be because CQ
Roll Call was more likely to demarcate that a member had
been a Congressional aide no matter how long they held this
position, while CQ Press may have only marked categorized
members as such if they had been a Congressional aide for a
substantial period.
Cross-referencing CQ Press and CQ Roll Call data
reveals that in the 114th Congress, there were thirty-two
former campaign aides, twenty-six former state legislative
aides, twelve former governor aides, and eleven former
White House aides as well as aides from other local, state,
and federal officials.160 Some, but certainly not a majority, of
these members of this specialized political class went to
public policy school. There were twenty-eight members of the
114th Congress who had a Master’s in Public Administration
(MPA) or a Master’s in Public Policy (MPP).161

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 33; Congressional Biographical Directory,
supra note 29.
160. CQ Press, supra note 5; CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 33.
161. There were eighteen MPAs and ten MPPs. Of these twenty-eight public
policy graduates, twelve were from Harvard’s Kennedy School. There were thirtythree MBAs in the 114th Congress. CQ Press, supra note 5; CQ ROLL CALL, supra
note 33.
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The rise of a specialized political class has largely
escaped scholarly scrutiny in the United States. However, in
other countries, like the United Kingdom and Australia,
commentators have noted the rise of a similar specialized
political class of individuals who have had a career working
in politics before winning elected office themselves.162 This
comparative data suggests that larger features of modern
politics, not contingent to the United States, may both help
create this specialized political class and enables them to be
particularly successful in winning elected office.
A handful of other occupational groups have also seen
greater representation in Congress in recent decades. Health
professionals, particularly doctors, have increased their
representation in Congress to over 6%, a level seemingly not
witnessed since the early Republic.163 The increase of doctors
in Congress could be driven in part because of the expansion
of health care as a part of the economy and the controversial
partial nationalization of the sector. Most doctors in the
current 114th Congress are Republican164 and several have
publicly expressed that one of their motivations to run for

162. PETER OBORNE, THE TRIUMPH OF THE POLITICAL CLASS (2007) (describing
the development of a political class in the United Kingdom, quite distinct from
the rest of the population, that is comprised of members of Parliament, assistants
to MPs, and lobbyists and employees of the voluntary sector); COOK, supra note
10, at 10 (describing the rise of a professional political class in Australia composed
of union officials, political staffers, local government councilors, and party
officials); Kate Jones, Professional Politicians as the Subjects of Moral Panic, 43(
AUSTRALIAN J. POL. SCI. 243, 248 (2008) (noting how in Australia, “[t]he
proliferation of staff for all members of parliament that has developed since the
1970s has made it easier, at least in the financial sense, to live for politics because
there are now far more possibilities of making a living in a political environment
at an earlier stage of a political career, or even after losing a seat”).
163. See supra Section II.B, Table 2.
164. Of the thirty-five members of the 114th Congress from a medicine
background, twenty-five are Republican. CQ Press, supra note 5; CQ ROLL CALL,
supra note 33. Doctors though are even more heavily Republican. Of the eighteen
doctors in Congress, fifteen are Republican. CQ Press, supra note 5; CQ ROLL
CALL, supra note 33. There are also three dentists, who are all Republican. CQ
Press, supra note 5; CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 33.
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Congress was to repeal or amend the Affordable Care Act.165
Health professionals in the 114th Congress have among the
highest median personal wealth of any occupational
background represented in Congress.166 They also
disproportionately used donations from other health
professionals to fund their campaigns.167
While the relative number of lawyers in Congress has
declined since World War II, those from a business
background have fared better with their representation
holding relatively steady having a slight rise in the 1980s
and early 1990s.168 In other words, as a specialized political
class has pushed out lawyers, this is not true of those from a
business background perhaps indicating that those from a
business background have, in fact, become more competitive
in politics relative to lawyers.
B. Specialization and Professionalization of Lawyers
Changes in the legal profession itself have likely also
contributed to the decline of lawyers in the U.S. Congress
165. See, e.g., Bucshon Talks About Life After Congress, EVANSVILLE COURIER
&
PRESS
(Apr.
18,
2017,
11:56
AM),
http://www.courierpress.com/story/news/politics/2017/04/18/bucshon-talks-lifeafter-congress/100574794/ (“I ran originally because of a lot of big issues [are]
happening in our country, and I think we just now have the opportunity with a
Republican president to make some changes in health care and regulations and
also taxes—things that I've been campaigning on, really, for seven years.”).
166. Of the twenty-five members of the 114th Congress who have medicine
listed first as an occupation by CQ Press, their median wealth is about $1.8
million. Compare CQ Press, supra note 5, with Center for Responsive Politics,
Net
Worth
2014,
http://www.opensecrets.org/pfds/
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
overview.php?type=W&amp;year=2013 (last visited June 10, 2017). Compare
this figure to law at about $700,000, business at $860,000, education at $760,000,
and public service/politics at $400,000. Compare CQ Press, supra note 5, with
Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 166.
167. In 2012, health professionals gave 14.28% of campaign contributions to
members of the House of Representatives from a medical background compared
to just 5.14% of contributions to the campaigns of other members of Congress. CQ
Press, supra note 5; Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 40.
168. See supra Table 2.
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and electoral politics more broadly. The initial increase of the
proportion of lawyers in Congress from Independence into
the late nineteenth century may have been caused in part by
the “de-professionalization” of the bar particularly during
the Jacksonian Era in which educational and training
requirements were dramatically reduced in many states
allowing more people to enter the profession.169 After 1870,
restrictions on entry into the profession began to increase
and formal legal training particularly through law schools
rose in prominence.170 After World War II, law became a
strictly post-graduate degree where previously many
pursued law as an undergraduate degree.171 As the path into
law became more formalized and restricted, this may have
reduced the number of lawyers in proportion to the educated
population, and many of those interested in politics may
have decided to forgo the increasing rigors of joining the bar
and instead pursue an alternative path to elected office.
The public face of lawyers also metamorphosed from the
late nineteenth century into the twentieth century. While in
the nineteenth century stories abounded of the public coming
to courtrooms to listen to the oratorical skills of top lawyers
and to be entertained by the cases of the day,172 by the end of
the century, many elite lawyers moved from the courtroom
to the corporate boardroom. Top lawyers no longer required
169. ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
AMERICA 129–72 (1965) (describing the decline of bar associations and associated
standards for practice in many states in the early nineteenth century); EULAU &
SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 32.
170. EULAU & SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 32–33.
171. The Juris Doctorate, a post-graduate degree, was first offered in the
United States at the University of Chicago in 1902. David Perry, How did
Lawyers Become “Doctors”? From the LL.B. to the J.D., PRACTICE (2013),
http://www.mobar.org/uploadedFiles/Home/Publications/Precedent/2013/Winter/
doctors.pdf. In 1971, all ABA approved law schools adopted the Juris Doctorate
(JD). Id.
172. CHROUST, supra note 169, at 101 (noting that in the frontier of the United
States court day was “a great social event, and to go ‘a-courting’ was a favorite
pastime”).
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large public followings to bring in business and instead could
rely on relationships with corporations or senior partners at
corporate law firms.173 This evolution from oratorically gifted
community leader, such as Daniel Webster, to that of a legal
technician in a law firm likely reduced the competitive
advantage of many lawyers in the political arena.174
As the salaries of corporate lawyers increased,
particularly starting in the 1970’s and 1980’s, talented
lawyers also had more financial incentive to stay in private
practice.175 As one Congressman recently lamented,
members of Congress make roughly the same salary as a
first-year associate fresh out of law school at a top corporate
law firm.176 Given the increasing cost of law school, the
relatively low salaries of politicians have become even more
unpalatable.177 At the same time, politics has become more

173. GORDON, supra note 51, at 80 (“Whereas reputation among the people had
been central to success in the 1840s, in the later part of the century entry into
the foremost ranks of the profession was assured if a handful of the right people
consulted the office-bound senior partner.”) (emphasis in original).
174. Robert L. Nelson & John P. Heinz, Lawyers and the Structure of Influence
in Washington, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 237, 240 (1988).
175. McDonald, supra note 130 (finding in the Australian context that highpaid barristers express concern of going into politics because of the potentially
negative impact on their income including the expectation that they leave
practice); Richard Perez Pena, Making Law vs. Making Money: Lawyers Abandon
Legislatures for Greener Pastures, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/21/weekinreview/nation-making-law-vsmaking-money-lawyers-abandon-legislatures-for-greener.html (arguing that
there has been a decline of lawyer representation in state legislatures because
lawyers have more lucrative alternatives elsewhere and it has become harder to
maintain a practice while being a legislator both because of the work involved
and financial disclosure requirements).
176. Confessions of a Congressman: 9 Secrets from the Inside, VOX (July 12,
2015),
http://www.vox.com/2015/2/5/7978823/congress-secrets
(highlighting
comments made by an anonymous member of Congress).
177. Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 177, 178 (2012) (noting law school tuition has increased four-fold in real
terms in private schools between 1971 and 2011 and public law schools in the
past two decades).
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of a full-time job even at the state and local level,178 and
lawyers may have to suspend their practice if elected to
office. With increasing specialization and competition within
law, lawyers may simply have less time, decreasing the
appeal of elected office.
Just as the costs of running for office have increased for
lawyers, some of the benefits have also declined in value. For
example, when there were bar-imposed restrictions on
advertising, lawyers once ran for political office in part to
advertise their legal practices.179 The Supreme Court has
since ruled many of these restrictions unconstitutional,
which has made running for office, as a form of advertising,
less necessary.180
Finally, lawyers as a group may have become less
interested in public service. Many scholars and practitioners
have lamented that the profession has become less publicspirited and increasingly commercialized.181 Even amongst
those lawyers who want to improve society, going into
politics seems to have lost some of its attraction. A recent
survey of Harvard law students found that only 15% had

178. For example, a number of state legislatures have gone from part-time to
full-time jobs. In 2014, at least ten state legislatures could be considered fulltime, sixteen could be considered part-time, and twenty-four a hybrid. Full- and
Part-Time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 1, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-timelegislatures.aspx. A number of states introduced professionalizing reforms in the
1960s and 1970s for their legislatures. Baker, supra note 95, at 601.
179. Schlesinger, supra note 110, at 27 (“Political campaigning is generally
regarded as an effective form of ethical advertising.”).
180. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the Supreme Court
ruled that lawyer advertisement was protected commercial speech under the
First Amendment, thus finding unconstitutional wholesale bans on lawyer
advertising.
181. See generally Kronman, supra note 145 (lamenting the decline of the
public spirited values of the profession); Robert Gordon, Portrait of a Profession
in Paralysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1427, 1440–46 (2002) (arguing the profession used
to have a noblesse oblige and eagerness to take on society’s problems and that
today lawyers have largely given up on collective public spiritedness).
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seriously thought about running for office compared to 19%
of Harvard Kennedy School students.182 Many of the
surveyed law students wanted to contribute to public service,
but did not think elected office was the most effective way to
do so.183 With the popularity of Congress at record lows,184
lawyers could simply believe that running for Congress, or
other elected office, is not a fruitful avenue for social change.
Indeed, given the widespread disparagement of politicians,
some lawyers may just view elected office including Congress
as below their social status.185
V. SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE LEGAL SYSTEM
This final part argues that the decline of lawyers in
Congress, and politics more generally, has affected the U.S.
legal system in two significant ways. First, a decline of
lawyer members of Congress means Congress is less likely to
further a lawyer- and court-centric vision of public
governance. Second, a decline of lawyers, and particularly
judges, within the political system has helped lead to a court
system staffed not by lawyer politicians, but by a more
specialized class of judges causing the judicial system to

182. Shauna Shames, The Rational Non-Candidate: A Theory of (Uneven)
Candidate Deterrence (Apr. 1, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University) (on file with author).
183. See id. (presenting her research findings which supported her conclusion
that, based upon the results, there were “few positive expectations [from
participants] about the usefulness of politics to solve problems they care about”).
As one recent Harvard Law student explained, “[m]any . . . come to HLS thinking
that they will run for elected office at some point may become hesitant to do so
because they see other alternatives as better—alternatives in which they could
have a bigger impact.” PRACTICE, supra note 106.
184. In 2013, 9% of the U.S. public surveyed by Gallup stated that they
approved of the way Congress was handling its job, which was the lowest result
since Gallup began surveying Congressional popularity in 1974. Congress and the
Public, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx (last
visited June 10, 2017).
185. McDonald, supra note 130 (finding in Australia that members of
Parliament may now be viewed as a low status occupation not fit for a high status
lawyer).
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become more inward looking, technocratic, and potentially
less independent.
A. Lawyers as Legislators
Since the beginning of the Republic, lawyer-politicians
have been perceived as having disproportionate influence in
shaping the country’s politics and policies. There have been
at least two strands of thought about lawyers’ impact: first,
that they act in their occupational self-interest to promote
policies that are frequently detrimental to the rest of society
and, second, and more charitably, that they promote an
approach to politics and policy that is uniquely grounded in
the constitution, rights, and the rule of law.
Each of these strands has been present since early in the
Republic’s history. For instance, the 1st Congress passed the
1789 Judiciary Act, which created the U.S. court system as
we know it.186 Controversially at the time, the Act set up
federal district and circuit courts—the Constitution had only
specified the requirement of having a federal Supreme
Court.187 During the Senate debate, Senator Maclay opposed
the Act, which he feared would strengthen the U.S. court
system and ultimately be used by the federal government to
control the states.188 Maclay noted that lawyer-members of
Congress had spearheaded the Act. He wrote in his journal:
[I]t was fabricated by a knot of lawyers, who joined hue and cry to
run down any person who will venture to say one word about it. This

186. Landmark Judicial Legislation: Judiciary Act of 1879, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_02.html
(last
visited May 28, 2017) (providing a short history of the Judiciary Act of 1789).
187. Id.
188. See WILLIAM MACLAY, JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY, UNITED STATES
SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA, 1789–91 117 (Edgar S. Maclay ed., 1890). (“I
opposed this bill from the beginning. It certainly is a vile law system, calculated
for expense and with a design to draw by degrees all law business into the Federal
courts. The Constitution is meant to swallow all the State Constitutions by
degrees, and thus to swallow, by degrees, all the State judiciaries.”)
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I have repeatedly experienced . . . [Senator] Grayson, though a
lawyer, told me yesterday that it was in vain to attempt anything
[against the Bill]. The people who were not lawyers, on a
supposition that lawyers knew best, would follow the lawyer . . . .189

Significantly, he claimed in his journal that he felt
lawyers pushed for district and circuit courts in part to create
more appeals, and so business, for the legal profession.190
Some forty years later, after visiting the United States
in the 1830’s, Alexis de Tocqueville took a very different
perspective on what he saw as the substantial positive
influence of lawyer politicians on U.S politics. His relevant
observation in Democracy in America is worth quoting at
length:
As most public men [in the United States] are or have been legal
practitioners, they introduce the customs and technicalities of their
profession into the management of public affairs . . . The language
of the law thus becomes, in some measure, a vulgar tongue; the
spirit of the law, which is produced in the schools and courts of
justice, gradually penetrates beyond their walls into the bosom of
society, where it descends to the lowest classes, so that at last the
whole people contract the habits and the tastes of the judicial
magistrate. The lawyers of the United States form a party which is
but little feared and scarcely perceived, which has no badge peculiar
to itself, which adapts itself with great flexibility to the exigencies
of the time and accommodates itself without resistance to all the
movements of the social body. But this party extends over the whole
community and penetrates into all the classes which compose it; it
acts upon the country imperceptibly, but it finally fashions it to suit
its purposes.191

De Tocqueville’s vision of lawyers furthering the
language of the law in U.S. politics is sweeping and difficult
to verify. Scholars that have attempted to empirically show
189. Id. at 97.
190. See id. at 108 (looking at England, he observed that, by the time two
parties reached the House of Lords, they had spent so much money going through
lower courts that “one or both are completely ruined . . . . For never was so
admirable a machine contrived by the art of man to use men’s passions for the
picking of their pockets.”).
191.

DE TOCQUEVILLE,

supra note 1, at 280.
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the differences that lawyers may make in politics in
narrower areas have had mixed results. For example,
McCloskey and Brill did find in their book Dimensions of
Tolerance that compared to the general public, or even
community elites, that legal elites were more likely to
support civil liberties such as free speech, association, and
due process rights.192 Still, this does not prove that lawyer
politicians then indoctrinate these values in the American
public, or even that lawyer politicians are more likely to
uphold these values in their work as representatives.193
The last Part of this Article speculates about the role
lawyer politicians may have historically played in cementing
rights and the rule of law into the political discourse of the
nation, but this section makes a more limited set of claims.
It argues that lawyers in Congress have been more likely to
promote a specific vision of the court system—one that may
be in their own occupational self-interest, but also one that
is seemingly based on their understanding of what is in the
best interests of the country. The influence of lawyers in
promoting this vision has almost certainly reduced since the
1st Congress, when Senator Maclay complained about
lawyer-members of Congress steamrolling through the 1789
Judiciary Act for their own purposes.194 Not only are there
proportionally fewer lawyers in Congress today, but the
growth of policy aides, think tanks, and lobbying groups
means that the influence of lawyer-members in crafting and
promoting legislation related to the legal system has
192. HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT
AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES, 53–54 Table 2.1, 129 Table 3.6, 148–
49 Table 4.1 (1983).
193. Anecdotal evidence also casts doubt on such broad claims. See e.g.,
Andrew Hacker, Are There Too Many Lawyers in Congress?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5,
1964),
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/01/05/are-there-too-many-lawyers-incongress.html (noting that during the McCarthy Era, most of the House members
of the Committee for Un-American Activities were lawyers and not particularly
sensitive to due process rights).
194. MACLAY, supra note 188, at 117.
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declined. Yet, even in recent years, the evidence shows that
lawyer-members of Congress have disproportionate
influence over the U.S. legal system and, on average, have
approached it differently compared to other members.
One way to see this difference is through voting records.
A number of post-World War II studies have found that
whether a member of Congress is a lawyer or not is rarely a
significant factor that influences a member’s voting
stance.195 That said, there is evidence that a member’s
occupational background does affect legislators’ behavior in
specific contexts with potentially significant policy
consequences. For example, one study from the 1970s found
that lawyer-members of legislatures in four states were less
supportive of no-fault insurance proposals.196 Susan RoseAckerman and Robert Evenson, in a study in the 1980s,
found that, controlling for other variables, states with more
farmer legislators were more likely to support funding for
more agricultural research.197 Similarly, Nick Carnes has
195. EULAU & SPRAGUE, supra note 6 at 122–23 (noting that studies have
generally found little difference between the behavior of lawyer and non-lawyer
representatives); MILLER, supra note 96, at 4 (commenting that a set of
quantitative studies from the 1950s to the 1990s could not demonstrate
discernible differences in the voting behavior of lawyer and non-lawyer
legislators). Political scientists point to other factors as affecting Congressional
performance, which have little to do with members’ previous occupations.
RICHARD F. FENNO JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 137
(1978) (finding that the behavior of members of Congress were shaped by a desire
to be reelected, a desire to gain power within Congress, a desire to promote their
public policy preferences, and a desire to secure gain outside Congress); DAVID
MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13 (1974) (arguing that the
major driver of members of Congress actions is a desire to be reelected).
196. James A. Dyer, Do Lawyers Vote Differently? A Study of Voting on NoFault Insurance, 38 J. POL. 452, 454–55 (1976) (finding evidence that lawyers are
less supportive of no-fault insurance legislative proposals in New York,
California, Florida, and Minnesota, but no such effect in two roll call votes in the
US Senate).
197. Susan Rose-Ackerman & Robert Evenson, The Political Economy of
Agricultural Research and Extension: Grants, Votes, and Reapportionment, 67
AM. J. AG. ECONOMICS 1, 8 (1985) (showing that states where farmers were able
to organize more successfully to elect other farmers to legislatures were more
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documented that members of Congress from a working class
occupational background are less likely to vote for
conservative economic policies.198
An analysis of Congressional voting records by the
author finds that lawyers in Congress also vote differently
than other members on certain issues affecting the legal
system. For example, in recent years, lawyer members of the
House of Representatives are more likely to support funding
for the Legal Services Corporation (LSC). The LSC is the
primary vehicle through which the federal government funds
civil legal aid programs in the country.199 Of the four votes
examined, two, in 2011 and 2014, were to eliminate the
LSC’s budget entirely—both were defeated.200 There was
also a vote in 2015 to cut the LSC’s budget by $25 million and
to use the money to increase the funding of the Federal
Bureau of Intelligence by the same amount.201 In 2014 the
House voted to increase the budget of the LSC by $15 million
using money from the Drug Enforcement Agency’s budget.202
likely to support increased funding for agricultural research).
198. See Nicholas Carnes, Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the
Working Class in Congress Matter? 37 LEGIS. STUD. QUAR. 5, 22 (2012) (noting
how “the underrepresentation of the working class in Congress skews roll-call
voting in favor of conservative policies”).
199. Who We Are, LEGAL SERVICES CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about-lsc/who-weare (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
200. 157 CONG. REC. H899 (2011) (proposing to eliminate the LSC’s $324
million budget in 2011); Final Vote Results for Roll Call, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: OFFICE OF THE CLERK (Feb. 16, 2011, 2:22 PM),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll054.xml; 160 CONG. REC. H4961 (2014)
(proposing to eliminate the LSC’s $350 million budget in 2014 and to apply the
savings to the spending reduction account); Final Vote Results for Roll Call 253,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: OFFICE OF THE CLERK (May 29, 2014, 6:40 PM),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2014/roll253.xml.
201. 161 CONG. REC. H3701 (2015); Final Vote Results for Roll Call 275, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: OFFICE OF THE CLERK (June 3, 2015, 1:47 PM),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2015/roll275.xml.
202. 160 CONG. REC. H4930 (2014); Final Vote Results for Roll Call 248, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: OFFICE OF THE CLERK (May 29, 2014, 2:15 PM),
http://clerk.house/gov/evs/2014/roll248.xml.
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Both of these proposals were also defeated.203 None of these
votes are pure gauges of members’ support for the LSC as
each vote involved tradeoffs between LSC funding and the
funding of other agencies or using money cut from the LSC
to reduce the budget deficit. However, the 2011 and 2014
votes on whether or not to eliminate the LSC’s budget
entirely are likely the best barometer of members’ support
for the LSC as the votes were not merely a question of
increasing or decreasing the LSC’s budget compared to other
competing needs, but of eliminating the LSC altogether.
In these four votes, Democrats overwhelmingly voted as
a block to support LSC funding, but there was more variation
among Republicans.204 Among these Republicans, Table 7
shows that lawyer members of the House were more likely to
support funding for the LSC than non-lawyer members in all
four votes.205 However, only in one—the vote to eliminate all
LSC funding in 2014—was this result statistically
significant (at p=0.007, the result is highly statistically
significant).206 Overall, these findings present substantial
evidence that lawyer members of the House, specifically
Republican lawyer members, are more likely to support LSC
funding.207
Lawyer-members of the House of Representatives also

203. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: OFFICE OF THE CLERK, supra note 200;
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: OFFICE OF THE CLERK, supra note 201.
204. See infra Table 7. As Table 7 shows, the exception is the 2014 vote to
increase LSC funding by $15 million with cuts to the DEA, which divided a more
substantial group of the Democrats.
205. See infra Table 7.
206. See infra Table 7.
207. See infra Table 7. Republican lawyer-members of Congress certainly do
not support the LSC monolithically and many non-lawyer members also support
LSC funding. Further, the support of lawyer-members may not be particularly
strong. For example, in 2014, while forty-six Republican lawyer-members of the
House voted against eliminating the LSC’s entire budget, the same year only four
Republican lawyer members of the House voted for increasing the LSC’s budget
by $15 million by reducing the DEA’s budget.
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seem to be more likely to oppose certain types of tort reform.
In March 2012, the House of Representatives voted on a bill
that limited punitive damages in medical malpractice claims
to $250,000 and allowed judges to restrict the payment of
contingency fees to lawyers.208 It passed the House 223 to 181
with most Republicans supporting the bill and most
Democrats opposing it.209 However, ten Republicans voted
against this bill, of whom eight were lawyers, and seven
Democrats voted for it, of which only one was a lawyer.210
The high presence of Republican lawyers voting against the
bill is highly statistically significant (p=0.00).211

208. For the legislative history of the bill, see Protecting Access to Healthcare,
H.R. 5, 112th Cong. (2012), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112thcongress/house-bill/5/all-actions (last visited May. 28, 2017).
209. Final Results for Roll Call 126, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OFFICE
CLERK, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2012/roll126.xml (last visited May 28,
2017).
OF THE

210. Compare id., with CQ Press, supra note 5.
211. See infra Table 8.
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7. House of Representatives Lawyer and Non-Lawyer
Support of Amendments for Funding of Legal Services
Corporation (LSC) (2011–2015)212

TABLE

Eliminate All LSC Funding (2011)

Yes

No

% Yes

1

191

–

Republican Non-lawyer

125

47

72.7%

Republican Lawyer

45

21

68.2%

Democrats

p=0.492
Eliminate All LSC Funding (2014)
Democrats

0

186

–

Republican Lawyers

31

46

40.3%

Republican Non-Lawyers

85

58

59.4%
p=.007

Increase $15 million (2014)
Democrat Lawyers

71

11

86.1%

Democrat Non-Lawyers

92

15

86.0%
p=0.905

Republican Lawyers

4

73

5.2%

Republican Non-Lawyers

6

139

4.1%
p=0.718

Cut $25 million (2015)
Democrats

3

181

–

Republican Lawyers

48

27

64%

Republican Non-Lawyers

112

55

67.1%
p=0.641

212. CQ Press, supra note 5.
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TABLE 8. Tort Reform Limiting Medical Malpractice Claims,
112th Congress

Party and Lawyer Status

Yes

No

% Yes

Republican Lawyers

55

8

87.3%

Republican Non-Lawyers

161

2

98.8%
p=0.00

Democratic Lawyers

1

72

1.4%

Democratic Non-Lawyers

6

99

5.7%
p=0.142

In these case studies, the variation in voting behavior of
lawyer and non-lawyer members of Congress may be, in part,
a product of occupational self-interest. Self-interest could
help explain why lawyer-members are more likely to be
opposed to no fault insurance (which would reduce tort
litigation). These lawyer-members of Congress may not
themselves be personal injury attorneys, but since lawyermembers are more likely to receive campaign contributions
from other lawyers, their vote may be in response to a key
constituency.213
However, in the case of votes on the LSC occupational
self-interest is a less likely story: few lawyer-members of
Congress come from a legal aid background, legal aid
employs relatively few lawyers, and legal aid lawyers have
relatively little money to make campaign contributions.214
Instead, a possible explanation for these votes is the effect of
professional affinity. For instance, because of their
213. See Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 40 (highlighting the total
amount of campaign contributions during the 2016 election cycle made by
lawyers and lobbyists, as a sector.
214. Only 1% of U.S. lawyers in 2005 were either a legal aid attorney or a
public defender. Lawyer Demographics: Year 2015, AM. B. ASS’N (2015),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/l
awyer-demographics-tables-2015.authcheckdam.pdf.
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professional training, it may be easier for lawyers to
understand what civil legal aid is and the need for it, which
could be obscure to other members, or lawyer-members may
place more value on legal access issues given their law
background. Similarly, lawyer-members of the House may be
more inclined to believe that a liberal tort system is more
likely to generate beneficial social outcomes.
These examples of votes on legal aid funding and tort
reform show that, on certain issues affecting the legal
system, having more lawyer legislators can matter to
legislative outcomes. Being a lawyer or not also influences
how members of Congress approach the justice system in
other ways. For instance, lawyer-members of Congress are
more likely to sit on the judiciary committee. In 2016,
fourteen of the twenty members (or 70%) of the Senate
Judicial Committee were lawyers215 as were twenty-eight of
thirty-nine members of the House Judicial Committee (or
72%).216 As a result, lawyer-members have a
disproportionate say on issues related to the legal system
through their work on these committees. In a study from the
1990s, Mark Miller argues that, because of the high number
of lawyer-members, the two judicial committees in Congress
act in a more court-like fashion than other committees and
that the constitutionality of the actions of these committees
are more closely scrutinized by members.217 Miller also
215. Compare Committee Members, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/members (last visited Dec. 10, 2016), with
CQ Press, supra note 5.
216. Lynette P. Perkins, Member Recruitment to a Mixed Goal Committee: the
House Judiciary Committee, 43 J. POL. 348, 358 (1981) (finding that lawyers were
more likely to volunteer for an assignment on the House Judiciary Committee
because they felt they already had expertise in the area and so would require less
learning); Compare Full Committee, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE,
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/committee-members
(last
visited May 28, 2017), with CQ Press, supra note 5.
217. See MILLER, supra note 96, at 160 (finding “[g]enerally, the Judiciary
Committee [in the House] reacts to constitutional questions in a very judicial,
courtlike fashion. Although political considerations are always important, the
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presents evidence that lawyer legislators generally have
more favorable attitudes towards the courts and are more
likely to express a desire to protect their independence, by
being less likely to want to strip courts of their jurisdiction
or overturn their decisions through legislation.218
Other scholars have noted that members of Congress
often cite their occupational background as inspiration for
both running for office and the legislation that they prioritize
while in Congress.219 This is true of lawyers as well. For
example, some lawyers in Congress will highlight their
experience as prosecutors in describing why they sponsor
bills related to criminal justice.220 Lawyers in Congress also
organize around issues in which they have previous
professional experience. Indeed, the founding members of
the Congressional Legal Aid Caucus, the Congressional
Criminal Justice and Public Safety Caucus, and the
Congressional Prosecutors Caucus are not surprisingly
almost all lawyers.221

best constitutional or legal argument almost always wins.”).
218. Id. at 104–05, 121.
219. See, e.g., NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE COLLAR GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN
ROLE OF CLASS IN ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 64–65 (2013) (listing examples of
legislators who state they draw on their previous occupation when making
legislation).
220. See, e.g., Former Prosecutor Rep. Swalwell Announces Support for
Rational Federal Marijuana Policy, SWALWELL.HOUSE.GOV, https://swalwell.
house.gov/media-center/press-releases/former-prosecutor-rep-swalwellannounces-support-rational-federal (last visited May 28, 2017) (describing how
the Congressman’s prosecutorial experience led to a belief that marijuana laws
needed to be rationalized).
221. Compare Sam Wright, Members of Congress Launch Bipartisan Legal Aid
Caucus, ABOVE L. (Dec. 8, 2015, 12:58 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/
2015/12/members-of-congress-launch-bipartisan-legal-aid-caucus/
(showing
Representatives Joseph Kennedy and Susan Rice, both lawyers, were founding
members of the Legal Aid caucus), and Bipartisan House Coalition Launches
Caucus Aimed at Criminal Justice Reform, JEFFRIES.HOUSE.GOV (July 14, 2015),
http://jeffries.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/bipartisan-house-coalitionlaunches-caucus-aimed-at-criminal-justice (three of the four founding members
of the caucus were lawyers), with CQ Press, supra note 5.
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More generally, lawyer-members of Congress may be
more likely to support using tactics to solve social problems
that resonate with their experience in the legal profession.
Robert Kagan and others have argued that compared to
other countries, the United States has embraced “adversarial
legalism” to achieve public policy goals, whether in relation
to the environment, criminal law, consumer harm, or social
welfare benefits.222 This approach to public policy involves
formal legal contestation that is driven by the disputing
parties223 as opposed to policy implementation through a
Weberian bureaucratic legalism driven by hierarchical
authority, which is more common in Europe.224 Adversarial
legalism relies on the creation of rights, strong judicial
review, and assertive lawyers.225
The central role of adversarial legalism in the United
States is likely part of the reason lawyers have had such a
high profile in the country fostering their success in politics.
However, adversarial legalism itself is arguably produced in
part by lawyers’ prevalence in politics in the first place. This
is not to say that lawyers’ ubiquity in politics is the sole or
even primary reason that adversarial legalism thrives. A
fractured political system and longstanding voter distrust of
strong government are likely more significant drivers.226 And
certainly, not all lawyers support adversarial legalism and

222. For a definition of adversarial legalism, see KAGAN, supra note 19, at 9.
For further study of the effect of adversarial legalism in the United States, see
BARNES & BURKE, supra note 2, at 4–5.
223. KAGAN, supra note 19, at 9.
224. Id. at 11.
225. BARNES & BURKE, supra note 2, at 1–3 (discussing importance of rights,
courts, and litigation to adversarial legalism); KAGAN, supra note 19, at 12–14
(detailing how adversarial legalism is based in lawyers bringing cases to the
courts, frequently on the basis of rights).
226. KAGAN, supra note 19, at 14–16 (finding that a “fragmented state” and a
mistrust of government are key elements of why adversarial legalism has
flourished in the United States).
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many promote other ways of solving policy challenges.227 Yet,
in a country where lawyers are so embedded in the political
system—and these lawyers are taught a specific legal
ideology in law school and by the bar about how to address
societal problems that prioritizes courts, private rights of
action, and an ethics of zealous advocacy,228—it should not
be surprising that adversarial legalism has flourished in the
United States.
The effect on the U.S legal system of having so many
lawyers in Congress has frequently been diffuse and subtle,
but also significant and frequently measurable. It has
arguably helped lead to a greater role for lawyers and courts
in the U.S. system of government. As the next Section shows,
the legal system has not just been affected by whether or not
lawyers are members of Congress, but also by whether or not
former or aspiring politicians have themselves held office in
the justice system.
B. Politicians in the Courts
The United States is often described as having a
politicized judiciary.229 At the federal level, the Presidency is
viewed as the key to controlling appointments to the courts
and the confirmation of judges in the Senate frequently
witnesses heated partisan debate.230 At the state level, many
judges are elected often through partisan elections while

227. Id. at 55 (“many judges and lawyers strive to dampen adversarial
legalism”).
228. Id. at 55–56.
229. CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
(showing that Democratic
and Republican appointed federal judges vote differently from each other in many
domains).
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 17–18, 20–21, 23, 26–27 (2006)

230. Nominations, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
common/briefing/Nominations.htm (last visited June 11, 2017) (noting that
nearly a quarter of Supreme Court justice nominations to the Supreme Court
since 1789 have failed to be confirmed).
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governors directly appoint many other judges.231 Meanwhile,
prosecutors are elected in most states, while U.S. Attorneys
are appointed directly by the president at the federal level.232
The U.S. legal system though has also historically been
politicized in another less noticed way. Practicing lawyers,
and more specifically judges and prosecutors, have
commonly later become politicians while politicians have
frequently later become judges and, less often,
prosecutors.233 Over the years though, there has been a
decline of lawyers whose careers crisscross the legal system
and, more explicitly, the political branches of government. As
this Article has emphasized, there has been an overall
decline of lawyers in Congress, but as illustrated in Table 9
below, there has been an even more substantial drop in the
prevalence of former judges in Congress.234 At the same time,
there has been a drop in former members of Congress
becoming judges.235 The number of former prosecutors in
Congress has also declined at least from the rates of the 71st
Congress.236

231. For a description of the selection process of judges at the state level, see
U.S. DEP’T JUST., supra note 117, at 5.
232. 28 U.S.C. § 541(a)-(b) (stating that U.S. Attorneys are appointed by the
president for a four-year term); U.S. DEP’T JUST., supra note 117, at 2, 11.
233. See infra Table 9.
234. See infra Table 9.
235. See infra Table 9.
236. The strikingly high number of former prosecutors in Congress in the 71st
Congress was likely in part caused by the central role prosecutors played in the
Progressive Era, which gave them an ideal platform for higher office. JOHN L.
WORRALL, THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 8–9 (2008) (John
L. Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008) (noting that while
prosecutors were seen as a rather insignificant office in the justice system for
much of the 19th century, beginning in the early 20th century, as they solidified
their powers in the executive branch, they gained prominence).
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TABLE 9. Experience of Lawyer Members of Congress as
Judge or Prosecutor

Judge Before

Judge After

Prosecutor
Before

21st (1829–30)237

22%

20%

17%

71st (1929–30)238

16%

10%

40%

114th (2015–16)

7%

–

25%

Congress

1. Aspiring Politicians in the Courts
The high number of judges and prosecutors who have
traditionally gone into politics has almost certainly affected
the historic functioning of the legal system. The experience
of the U.S. Supreme Court provides a prominent example.
Supreme Court justices do not usually have congressional
aspirations, but until the mid-twentieth century, a number
of Supreme Court justices had presidential or vice
presidential ambitions. For example, Justice Charles
Hughes became the 1916 Republican nominee for
president.239 In his research, William G. Ross finds that
between 1832 and 1956, one or more justices attempted to
obtain a presidential or vice presidential nomination in three
quarters of presidential elections.240

237. Six percent of lawyer members of Congress were a judge both before and
after serving in Congress. Congressional Biographical Directory, supra note 29.
They are included in Table 9 in the tally of lawyers who were a judge before office
and those after.
238. Two percent of lawyer members of Congress were a judge both before and
after serving in Congress. Congressional Biographical Directory, supra note 29.
They are included in Table 9 in the tally of lawyers who were a judge before office
and those after.
239. William G. Ross, Presidential Ambitions of U.S. Supreme Court Justices:
A History and an Ethical Warning, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 115, 141 (2011).
240. Id. at 115.
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Ross claims that these political aspirations, at times,
distracted Supreme Court justices from their judicial work
and tempted them to frame their decisions to appeal to
constituencies that could assist their candidacy.241 He argues
these ambitions also pushed other judges on the bench to
delay or speed up opinions in order to help or hurt the
advancement of their colleagues’ political careers.242 If
nothing else, the justices’ political aspirations undermined
the perceived independence of judges. For example, after
Justice Chase unsuccessfully sought the Democratic
nomination for president in 1868, The Nation wrote that he
had “destroyed popular confidence in his decisions,”
particularly in relation to Reconstruction in the South.243
Decades later, in reflecting on the presidential aspirations of
Supreme Court justices, Justice Felix Frankfurter openly
worried, “[w]hat is more inimical for good work on the Court
than for a Justice to cherish political, and more particularly
Presidential, ambition?”244 Similarly, Justice Roberts, in
1954, lamented that a number of justices:
have had in the back of their minds a possibility that they might get
the nomination for President. Now, that is not a healthy situation
because, however strong a man’s mentality and character, if he has
this ambition in his mind it may tinge or color what he does, and
that is exactly what the Founding Fathers wanted to remove from
the minds of the Supreme Court, to make them perfectly free
knowing that there was no more in life for them than the work of

241. Id. at 116. “Yale Law Professor Alexander Bickel warned that ‘the
recurrence of justices with manifest political aspirations would in time destroy
an institution whose strength derives from strength based on confidence.’” Id. at
161.
242. Id. at 121 (discussing how the Supreme Court may have delayed releasing
the Dred Scott decision until after the presidential election to dash the political
hopes of Justice McLean, who dissented, who aspired to be the Republican
candidate for president).
243. Id. at 125.
244. Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U.
PA. L. REV. 781, 787 (1957).
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the Court.245

Such political ambitions can also influence judges’
behavior in state courts. For example, Chief Justice Roy
Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court is a controversial
judge, who today is often in the political spotlight. In the
early 2000’s, he ordered the erection of a large replica of the
Ten Commandments at the Alabama Supreme Court’s
courthouse. A federal judge ordered the removal of the
replica, which Moore ignored, and he was eventually
suspended.246 Roy then unsuccessfully ran for Governor of
Alabama in 2006 and 2010247 before again being successfully
elected as Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court. In
2015, he ordered county probate judges to ignore a federal
ruling requiring them to issue same sex marriage licenses.
He was eventually suspended for these actions in May
2016.248 Although Chief Justice Moore’s judicial orders may
or may not have been linked to his larger political
aspirations, his actions can at least be rationally perceived
as being taken in part to advance his larger political
career.249

245. Ross, supra note 239, at 146 (quoting Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 4 of
the Comm. on the Judiciary on S.J. Res. 44, H.S. Res. 27, and H.S. Res. 91, 83rd
Cong. 22 (1954) (statement of Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court)).
246. Ten Commandments Judge Removed from Office, CNN.COM (Nov. 14, 2003,
6:56 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/13/moore.tencommandments/.
247. Mark Joseph Stern, Oh, Alabama. Not Roy Moore Again?, SLATE (Jan. 11,
2013, 1:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health-and-science/science/2013/
01/roy_moore_re_elected_in_alabama_ten_commandments_supreme_court_chie
f_justice.html.
248. Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore, Alabama Judge, Suspended Over Gay
Marriage Stance, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2ov5DXy.
249. Similarly, Ted Poe, a county judge in Texas, became well known in the
early 2000’s for the unorthodox sentences he gave to criminals such as ordering
thieves to carry signs in front of stores they robbed stating their crime. U.S.
Congressman
Ted
Poe
Second
District-Texas,
POE.HOUSE.GOV,
https://poe.house.gov/_cache/files/e/b/eb06871c-ab0c-4b8d-87b5-04f5c658b88d/
FD9352320542AD025AA666D7A04B9A14.ctp-longer-biography.pdf (last visited
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Prosecutors provide another illustration of how a
lawyer’s aspirations for higher elected office can influence
how they perform their duties in the justice system. While
members of Congress were once more likely to be a former
judge, today they are much more likely to be a former
prosecutor,250 and prosecutorial positions are still widely
seen as a jumping-off point towards a larger political
career.251 Yet, many commentators claim that politically
ambitious prosecutors focus too much on high profile cases
over more routine ones and over-zealously push for
prosecutions in order to gain favorable media attention with
an eye towards seeking further political office.252
2. Former Politicians in the Courts
The reduction of judges entering politics has also
corresponded with a decline of former politicians becoming
judges, as Table 9 indicates. It was once relatively common
for politicians, and specifically members of Congress, to
become Supreme Court justices. Before 1950, of the ninetyone justices appointed to that point, twenty-eight had
previously been members of Congress, or about 30%, and
about 70% had some experience in elected political office.253
However, after 1950, no new Supreme Court justice has been

Aug. 24, 2017). He was later elected to Congress in part based on the notoriety of
these sentences. Jonathan Turley, Shame on You, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/17/AR20050917
00064.html. It is difficult to know the motivation for Poe’s unconventional
sentencing behavior, but, once again, it may have been partially motivated by a
desire for media attention to further his personal political aims.
250. See supra Table 9.
251. ECONOMIST, supra note 124.
252. Id. Commentators have observed that elections subject prosecutors to
“untoward political influences”, “lead prosecutors to concentrate on high-profile
investigations,” “have the potential to corrupt prosecutors with campaign
contributions,” and “cause prosecutors to seek higher conviction rates.” Ellis,
supra note 117, at 1532.
253. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 353–66.
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a member of Congress254 and even elected political
experience is relatively uncommon. For instance, none of the
current Supreme Court justices have been an elected
politician.255
Instead, a more specialized judicial class with a narrower
set of career experiences and ambitions has pushed out
politician judges in federal courts.256 President Eisenhower
declared a policy of using appeals court appointments as a
stepping-stone to the Supreme Court—a selection criteria
followed by many presidents since then.257 Since 1950, 60%
of appointed U.S. Supreme Court justices previously served
as a federal judge compared to 22% before.258 In turn, the

254. House Members Who Became Members of the U.S. Supreme Court, Office,
U.S.
HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES,
http://artandhistory.house.gov/mem_bio/
mem_supreme.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2017); Senators Who Served on the U.S.
Supreme Court, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/
four_column_table/Supreme_Court.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2017) (showing
seventeen members of the House of Representatives, fifteen Senators, and three
members that have served in both chambers have gone on to be judges on the
U.S. Supreme Court).
255. Only Earl Warren and Sandra Day O’Connor had elected legislative or
executive experience since 1950, or two of twenty-five judges. EPSTEIN ET AL,
supra note 44, at 353–66.
256. Barry J. MacMillion, Cong. Research Serv., R43538, U.S. Circuit Court
Judges: Profile of Professional Experiences Prior to Appointment 7 (2014)
(finding that about 50% of active U.S. circuit judges in 2014 were a federal or
state judge immediately prior to appointment); Lee Epstein et al.,, The Norm of
Prior Judicial Experience and Its Effect for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 903, 933 (2003) (noting that “[b]etween 1789 and 1952, the
mean percentage of justices with some political background, either in legislative
or executive politics, hovered around 65%. Since 1952, that figure has dropped to
34%. Several explanations for this decline may exist, but surely the norm of
judicial experience is chief among them.”) (internal citations omitted).
257. Lee Epstein et al., Circuit Effects: How the Norm of Federal Judicial
Experience Biases the Supreme Court, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 833, 835, 837–38
(2009) (noting an increase in the number of Supreme Court justices who have had
experience as federal circuit court judges and finding that Supreme Court justices
displayed bias towards the circuit on which they previously sat).
258. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 367–74 (finding that fifteen of twentyfive Supreme Court Justices previously served as a federal judge after 1950
compared to nineteen of eighty-seven before 1950).
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nomination of more specialized federal appeals court and
district court judges has likely been reinforced by the
adoption of nominating commissions that were set up
starting in the 1970s.259
This turn towards a professionalized judiciary that
“promotes” many of its judges through the ranks instead of
selecting them from other prestigious careers, like political
office, may ironically reduce their independence. Such a
system places more emphasis on screening potential circuit
court and Supreme Court Judges based on their judicial
philosophy, as already articulated in their judgments, and so
also encourages judges to audition for elevation by adjusting
their behavior to make their nomination and confirmation
more likely.
While the norm of picking former federal court judges for
the Supreme Court started with Eisenhower, some scholars
have suggested that it originated with members of Congress
who were upset with the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board
of Education.260 They urged Eisenhower to pick judges who
would base their decisions upon “law,” not "sociology.”261
Nominees, who had previously been federal judges, were
259. For an overview of federal court nominating committees, see Federal
Judicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselection.us
/federal_judicial_selection/federal_judicial_nominating_commissions.cfm?state=
FD (last visited Apr. 22, 2017). At the state level, merit selection commissions,
set up first in California in 1934, but later adopted by many other states
particularly in the 1970s have played a similar role. For an overview of state
nominating commissions, see SHUGERMAN, supra note 117, at 208–12, 286–87;
Judicial Nominating Commissions, NAT’L CTR. ST. CT., http://data.ncsc.org/
QvAJAXZfc/opendoc.htm?document=Public%20App/SCO.qvw&host=QVS@qlikv
iewisa&anonymous=true&bookmark=Document\BM17 (last visited Apr. 22,
2017). There is less data on the number of politician judges in state supreme
courts. However, one study found in a survey of select state supreme courts that
the number of judges with political experience declined from 37.8% 29.2% from
1900–20 to 1950–70. Robert A. Kagan et al., American State Supreme Courts
Justices, 1900–1970, 2 AM. B. FOUNDATION RES. J. 371, 377 (1984).
260. John R. Schmidhauser, The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective
Portrait, 3 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1, 41 (1959).
261. Id.
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seen as more likely to have a more limited vision of their
role.262 Significantly, nominees, who have been judges, have
judicial records that can be scrutinized to better ensure their
political and judicial ideologies are in line with that of the
president.263 Selecting lawyer-politicians such as Governors
or members of Congress, to the Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals allows presidents to appoint party loyalists,264
though they usually have no judicial track record. They may
side with the president on the major issues of the day, but
their overall judicial philosophy can be difficult to determine
without a judicial track record.
The turn towards selecting former federal judges for the
Supreme Court may also cause judges to audition for these
roles. As Epstein, Landes, and Posner have found, federal
appeals court judges, who are considered likely candidates to
be nominated to the Supreme Court, are more likely to
support tough on crime decisions perhaps so they are not
tagged as “soft on crime” during the nomination process.265
There is some evidence that district court judges may also
alter their behavior if they believe they are likely to be
considered for the Court of Appeals.266
The rise of a specialized judicial class not only raises
concerns about the judiciary’s independence, but also
impoverishes its decision-making by reducing the number of
professional experiences, especially political experiences,

262. Epstein et al., supra note 257, at 910.
263. Id. (noting that a common complaint of appointing former federal judges
to the Supreme Court is that it gives the president and the Senate an opportunity
to assess the political ideology of potential candidates).
264. Id. (remarking that Eisenhower moved away from politician picks in part
to avoid the image of cronyism that had accompanied the picks of former
presidents).
265. LEE EPSTEIN

ET AL.,

THE BEHAVIOR

OF

FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL
(2013).

AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 359–63

266. Id. at 377–79 (finding evidence that district court judges “auditioning” to
be circuit judges are more likely to give longer prison sentences).
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that its judges draw upon. While there are a number of
methodological challenges in determining the effect of a
poorly diversified occupational background on judicial
performance, most studies have found some effect.267 A
number of commentators have also lamented the seeming
effect of the decline of judges with political experience. For
example, in 2016, the Supreme Court unanimously narrowed
the definition of what type of conduct constituted corruption
claiming that political officials had to perform concrete
governmental acts in exchange for bribes in order to be
prosecuted.268 Among those who criticized this judgment was
convicted former lobbyist Jack Abramoff. Abramoff claimed
that he continued “to be concerned by what seems to be a lack
of understanding on the part of the justices that a little bit of
money can breed corruption” and he blamed the disconnect
on the fact that “none of [the justices] have been in the
political process.”269 Abramoff is not alone in his concern.
Scholars have noted that judges who were formerly
politicians have more intimate knowledge about how the rest
of government functions including the political process, the
influence of money in politics, and whether Congress has
delegated away its essential powers to the executive.270
267. Epstein et al., supra note 256, at 954 (noting that “[t]o be sure, many
studies . . . have their share of conceptual and analytical problems. Nonetheless,
we should not ignore the common finding that a link exists between career
diversity and judicial decisions. Specifically, as we depict in the Appendix, of the
twenty-two studies located that investigate this linkage, nearly 70% found some
sort of a relationship between career experience and judicial choices.”).
268. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Vacates Ex-Virginia Governor’s Graft
Conviction, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2kEO9tG.
269. Carl Hulse, Is the Supreme Court Clueless About Corruption? Ask Jack
Abramoff, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2kdIeb7.
270. PAMELA KARLAN, A CONSTITUTION FOR ALL TIMES 58–59 (2013) (noting that
“today’s Court is far less diverse when it comes to political experience” and that
this may ironically lead to a Court with a false sense of confidence in relation to
the other branches of the federal government); Gordon Silverstein, Bench
Politics, NEW REPUBLIC (May 15, 2009), http://newrepublic.com/article/
61713/bench-politics (arguing that more politicians on the U.S. Supreme Court
would provide needed political and government experience to the Court).
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Finally, politician judges have experience navigating the
rest of government and engaging in the “wheeling and
dealing” of politics, a skill those in the judiciary often need.
Chief Justice William Howard Taft, who also served as
president, brought his high-level political experience to bear
when crafting and lobbying for the passage of the 1925
Judiciary Act that allowed the Supreme Court to gain almost
full control over its own docket.271 Chief Justice Charles
Evan Hughes, who had been a governor and the Republican
nominee for president, used quiet diplomacy to switch the
votes of justices on key New Deal legislation to placate the
administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who planned to
reorganize the Supreme Court in order to overturn rulings
that threatened Roosevelt’s legislative agenda.272 Even if
they are not convincing their colleagues to switch their votes
in order to save the institution, politician judges, more
generally, may have the political skills to bring greater
compromise and consensus to the judiciary.273 Further,
having a group of judges with diverse backgrounds may
make it more likely for them to listen to each other because
they believe they will hear a different perspective.
Some European countries that rely on a dedicated
judicial service where judges are promoted through the
ranks have recognized that a professionalized judicial class
can both limit the independence of the judiciary and reduce

271. Jeremy Buchman, Judicial Lobbying and the Politics of Judicial
Structure: An Examination of the Judiciary Act of 1925, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 10
(2003) (claiming that most scholars of Taft view his lobbying efforts for the 1925
Judiciary Act as critical for its passage).
272. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, THE HUGHES COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY
25–33 (2002).
273. Linda Greenhouse, A Judge and a Politician, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2009),
https://nyti.ms/2vtMKHv (arguing that more former politicians on the Supreme
Court would bring both real world experience and a proclivity to compromise);
Silverstein, supra note 270 (claiming that former politicians, such as Chief
Justices Marshall, Taft, and Warren, may have been able to bring more
unanimity to the Court’s decisions).
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the experiences judges have to draw upon.274 In part to
address this problem, these systems allow those with nonjudicial backgrounds on their constitutional courts.275
VI. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RULE OF LAW
Not only has the decline of lawyer-politicians in the
United States seemingly had a direct effect on the legal
system, but it could also, albeit more speculatively, impact
adherence to the rule of law in the country. The United
States has long been an outlier among nations in both how
early it established and how long it has sustained a liberal
democratic form of government.276 It was able to do so
because of a relatively distinctive set of historical and
political circumstances that are still much debated and will
not be explored here.277 However, one of the prominent
characteristics of U.S. democracy was the prevalence of a
class of lawyer-politicians in its legislatures, executive
mansions, and courts. This Article presents evidence that the
occupational background of members of Congress and judges

274. Epstein et al., supra note 256, at 939.
275. Id. at 939–40 (documenting that in Germany, France, and Italy, it is
relatively common to have those who are not judges appointed to their
constitutional court). For example, in France, former presidents can be a member
of the Constitutional Court as a matter of right. General Presentation, COUNSEIL
CONSTITUTIONAL, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/
english/presentation/general-presentation/general-presentation.25739.html
(last visited Apr. 18, 2017).
276. See MICHAEL BURRAGE, REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PROFESSION: ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES
228–29 (2006) (noting that compared to the revolutions in France and England,
the U.S. Revolution was unique in that it was not terminated by an authoritarian
regime); SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 13–16 (1991) (describing three waves of democratization
and reverse democratization in the world between 1828 and 1990 with the first
wave having its roots in the American and French revolutions).
277. See generally ROBERT E. SHALHOPE, THE ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN
THOUGHT AND CULTURE, 1760–1800 (2004).
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can affect their behavior.278 In a world where the rule of law
is viewed as increasingly under threat and many see a rising
tide of illiberalism within the United States,279 the decline of
the lawyer-politician should give defenders of liberal
democracy
pause.
Their
decline
may
expose
underappreciated vulnerabilities to the rule of law in the
United States—a system based not just on rules,
institutions, or the preferences of its people, but also on the
norms that the country’s leaders are immersed in and
follow.280
At the very beginning of the United States, the potential
link between lawyers as political leaders and the promotion
of liberal democracy was clearly recognized. Thomas
Jefferson promoted establishing professorships of law in
universities because he believed, drawing on a theory
developed by Montesquieu, that the country’s leaders needed
legal training so they would be committed to furthering the
rule of law.281 In Federalist 35, Alexander Hamilton claimed
278. For a fuller discussion of how occupational background may affect the
voting behavior of elected politicians, see supra Section V.A. For a discussion of
how occupational background may affect the decisions of federal judges, see supra
Section V.B.2.
279. See, e.g., Zakaria, supra note 28.
280. Many commentators have remarked on the importance of the norms
political leaders follow, not just democracy’s rules and institutions, for supporting
the rule of law in the United States and elsewhere. Clare Foran, An Erosion of
Democratic
Norms
in
America,
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
22,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/donald-trump-democraticnorms/508469/ (referencing an interview with Brendan Nyhan, a political
scientist at Dartmouth College, where Nyhan describes how violations of norms
by political leaders can lead to the breakdown of democracy); Steven Levitsky &
Daniel Ziblatt, Is Donald Trump a Threat to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/sunday/is-donald-trump-athreat-to-democracy.html?_r=0 (noting that democracy requires that leaders
follow strong norms of fair play and restraint).
281. Paul D. Karrington, The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal
Education, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 527–33 (1990) (describing Jefferson’s
project to develop university legal education to train an elite class responsible for
political leadership who would be committed to the rule of law). Montesquieu
similarly believed training in law was critical to be an active participant in a
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that a lawyer, as part of the learned professions, would, if
elected to the House of Representatives, be a uniquely
“impartial arbiter,” who would undertake public-spirited
action in the best interests of society.282 Alexis de Tocqueville
prominently argued that lawyers brought the language of the
law to politics and so helped instill liberal values in the
citizens and institutions of the young Republic.283 More
recently, scholars like Terrence Halliday and Lucien Karpik
have argued that the legal profession and bar associations
were critical to the building of democracy in the United
States.284
Lawyer-members of Congress do not have a monopoly on
valuing rights, due process, or an independent judiciary. And
some lawyer-politicians may actively subvert these values.285
Yet, due process and the protection of legal rights are the

democracy. Id. at 528.
282. THE FEDERALIST NO. 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Will not the merchant
understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of
the mechanic and manufacturing arts, to which his commerce is so nearly allied?
Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality to the
rivalships between the different branches of industry, be likely to prove an
impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear
to him conducive to the general interests of the society?”).
283.

DE TOCQUEVILLE,

supra note 1, at 280.

284. Terrence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik, Politics Matter: A Comparative
Theory of Lawyers in the Making of Political Liberalism, in LAWYERS AND THE RISE
OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO
TWENTIETH CENTURIES 39–41 (1997); FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM:
ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD 223–25 (2003) (arguing that the legal
profession more broadly has played a public-spirited and liberalism promoting
role in the U.S.); Robert Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of
Law: Some Critical Reflections, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 441, 449–59 (2010)
(arguing that there is relatively strong historical evidence in many countries for
lawyers having played a significant role in promoting rights consciousness and
cultures of legalism, while claiming there is a more mixed record of lawyers
promoting political freedom).
285. Indeed, in other countries, lawyers have not always mobilized on the
behalf of the rule of law and have acted to subvert these regimes. See Halliday &
Karpik, supra note 284, at 59–60 (noting how the example of lawyers complicity
in Nazi Germany shows that lawyers do not always promote liberal values).
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tools and language that lawyers are trained in and, as
already mentioned, some survey evidence indicates that, at
least historically, lawyer-legislators disproportionately
express supporting rule of law values such as judicial
independence.286 At the same time, the professionalization of
politics and the rise of a specialized political class in the
United States may also contribute to the view that
government is run by corrupt political insiders, which, in
turn, increases voters’ distrust of Congress and precipitates
calls for extralegal reform or action for these democratic
institutions.287 Meanwhile, a judiciary with more
technocratic judges and fewer politician judges may not have
the same independence or political savvy to check elected
leaders that do not uphold liberal rule of law values.288
Other constitutional democracies have shown liberal
democracies can thrive with far fewer lawyer-politicians
than the United States, but these countries also have their
own unique histories, and lawyers, in fact, have frequently
had a critical role in supporting liberal values in these
democracies as well.289 Furthermore, just because lawyerpoliticians are not a necessary ingredient to the rule of law
does not mean that they have not historically acted as a
buffer against illiberal forces in the United States whether
in Congress or perhaps even more significantly in the

286. MILLER, supra note 96, at 104–05, 117–18.
287. In recent years, the job approval rating of Congress has averaged below
20%. GALLUP, supra note 172. There are many reasons for this low approval
rating, but one may be the rise of a specialized political class.
288. See supra Section V.B.
289. Halliday & Karpik, supra note 284, at 22–27, 39–41 (describing how
lawyers and bar associations played a critical role in creating liberal societies in
England, France, and the United States); see generally THE FATES OF POLITICAL
LIBERALISM IN THE BRITISH POST-COLONY: THE POLITICS OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX
(Terence C. Halliday et al. eds., 2012) (referencing a series of studies in former
British colonies, which sought to understand which portions of the respective
legal systems protected political liberalism and which portions did not).
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Executive.290
The response to this decline should not be to go back to
an era when a relatively small group of lawyer-politicians
dominated both political and judicial offices, which no longer
even seems possible. Today’s bar is quite different than in
the past—more specialized, fractured, and commercialized—
which has seemingly weakened its ability to act as a publicspirited guardian of the rule of law.291 Many lawyers that are
in Congress today also were former political aides or
members of civil society, which also has potentially
weakened any unique professional perspective on the rule of
law that lawyers may have traditionally brought to
politics.292 Further, other groups that have come into politics
bring new perspectives and comparative advantages. For
example, the bar’s traditional hierarchical nature has
arguably limited the number of women who could use the
profession as a gateway into elected office—a drawback other
occupational gateways into politics do not seem to suffer to
the same degree.293 At any rate, the specialization witnessed
in U.S. politics and the judiciary is seemingly part of a much
290. See generally Halliday & Karpik, supra note 284. The effect of the decline
of lawyers in the Presidency and the cabinet is even more difficult to quantify
than their decline in Congress since, for members of Congress, one can at least
compare votes of members of different occupational backgrounds on the same
legislation. Still, it is perhaps in the implementation of the law that norms about
the rule of law play the most important role.
291. The heyday of the generalist lawyer who had the time to actively engage
in civic life seems behind us—lost to a professional life that revolves around the
pressures of the billable hour for corporate lawyers or just finding work for an
increasing number of other lawyers. DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 172–74 (2009) (noting that
the greater division of labor in the legal profession means lawyers now have less
experience representing a diverse range of clients); ZAKARIA, supra note 284, at
225 (noting that the cartel like nature of the bar allowed lawyers to actively
engage in politics, but that with increased commercial pressure they were less
well situated to take on a public spirited leadership role).
292. For example, thirty-eight of the 209 lawyers in the 114th Congress had
also been members of the specialized political class. CQ Press, supra note 5.
293. See Section II.B.
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broader trend of specialization across occupations that seems
unlikely to disappear.294
This Article does not attempt to develop remedies to
address the potential vulnerabilities created by the decline
of the lawyer-politician, but one potential response could be
a recommitment to training the country’s leaders and
citizens in law and civics. Academics and public intellectuals
from Ezra Stiles in the eighteenth century295 to Martha
Nussbaum today296 have made pleas for a substantial
national investment in teaching civic education and critical
thinking skills in order to promote democracy and
responsible self-governance. This need seems particularly
acute in a society where universities are increasingly
preoccupied with producing market-ready graduates for jobs
in corporations and the broader business world.297
294. The specialization that has helped lead to a decline of lawyers in politics
and the decline of lawyer-politicians within the judiciary has also occurred in
other fields. For example, in business, the rise of MBA graduates has likely
helped lead to a fall in the number of lawyers who are Fortune 500 CEOs. Marsha
Ferziger Nagorsky, Creating Business Leaders: A Plan for the Future, U. CHI. L.
SCH.
(Fall
2013),
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall13/
businessleaders. In policymaking circles, lawyers must now vie with public policy
school graduates and those with doctorates in economics and other social
sciences, which has diminished their influence in this area. Bruce Ackerman,
Why Legal Education Should Last for Three Years, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-legal-education-should-last-forthree-years/2013/09/06/55d80c06-1025-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html?
utm_term=.f33a2c798e29.
295. Karrington, supra note 281, at 542.
296. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, NOT FOR PROFIT: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS THE
HUMANITIES (2010) (arguing that education has become too focused on increasing
gross domestic profit and not on equipping students to challenge authority and
think critically); see also MICHAEL S. ROTH, BEYOND THE UNIVERSITY: WHY LIBERAL
EDUCATION MATTERS (2015) (claiming that the United States needs to emphasize
an education of students in university that cultivates individual freedom and
civic virtue).
297. ROTH, supra note 296. Law schools themselves have been criticized for
increasingly providing an education that focuses on the business of law instead
of its higher public-spirited principles. BEN W. HEINEMAN JR., WILLIAM F. LEE &
DAVID WILKINS, LAWYERS AS PROFESSIONALS AND AS CITIZENS: KEY ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 49 (2014) (arguing that focusing on

2017] DECLINE OF THE LAWYER-POLITICIAN

737

The United States is witnessing a shift from a republic
led by lawyer-politicians to one with politicians from an
increasingly specialized political class and judges that are
more professionalized and technocratic than before. This is a
significant shift in the country’s political ecosystem. It is a
period that should be approached with circumspection and a
renewed commitment to ensuring not only that the country’s
rules and institutions are oriented towards promoting the
rule of law, but also its leaders and citizens.

producing practice-ready graduates will not best serve the broader public-spirited
goals of the profession).

